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THE MEANING OF A MISDEMEANOR IN A
POST-FERGUSON WORLD: EVALUATING
THE RELIABILITY OF PRIOR CONVICTION
EVIDENCE
John D. King*
Despite evidence that America’s low-level courts are
overburdened, unreliable, and structurally biased,
sentencing judges continue to uncritically consider a
defendant’s criminal history in fashioning an
appropriate punishment. Misdemeanor courts lack
many of the procedural safeguards that are thought to
ensure accuracy and reliability. As with other stages of
the criminal justice system, people of color and poor
people are disproportionately burdened with the
inaccuracies of the misdemeanor system.
This Article examines instances in which sentencing
courts have looked behind the mere fact of a prior
conviction and assessed whether that prior conviction
offered any meaningful insight for the subsequent
sentence. This Article then proposes a framework by
which defendants should be allowed to challenge the use
of prior conviction evidence in the sentencing context,
arguing that the government should bear the burden of
persuasion once the defendant sufficiently satisfies a
burden of production. Ultimately, however, this Article
suggests that courts and legislatures consider
categorical exemptions from the use of prior
misdemeanor convictions in imposing sentences. Failure
to critically examine this evidence risks introducing and
compounding the biases and errors of low-level courts
into more serious sentencing proceedings.
Clinical Professor of Law, Director of Experiential Education, and Director of the Criminal
Justice Clinic, Washington and Lee University School of Law; LL.M., 2005, Georgetown
University Law Center; J.D., 1996, University of Michigan Law School; B.A., 1992, Brown
University. Thanks to Kimberly Blasey for excellent research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2014, the shooting of an 18-year-old, unarmed black man by a
white police officer sparked demonstrations and civil unrest in
Ferguson, Missouri.1 One of many unforeseen consequences of these
events was a reevaluation of how America’s low-level courts
administer justice. The 2015 Department of Justice (DOJ)
Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department Report2 forced
Americans to consider the realities of not only how poor Americans
are policed, but also how they are adjudicated in America’s courts.3
While some debate whether, and to what extent, the situation
described in the Ferguson Report is an outlier,4 other sources lend
support to the idea that America’s low-level courts are failing to
deliver on the promise of due process, fundamental fairness, and
accurate factfinding.5 Critiques of the misdemeanor adjudication
system have a long history.6 But the greatly expanded reach of the

1 See generally Timeline of Events in Shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, AP NEWS
(Aug. 8, 2019), https://apnews.com/9aa32033692547699a3b61da8fd1fc62.
2 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf
[hereinafter
FERGUSON REPORT].
3 See Terrence McCoy, Ferguson Shows How a Police Force Can Turn into a Plundering
‘Collection
Agency’,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
5,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/03/05/ferguson-shows-how-apolice-force-can-turn-into-a-plundering-collection-agency/?utm_term=.1cef407c4b6c
(“[W]hen people couldn’t pay, they were arrested.”).
4 See Richard Rosenfeld, Ferguson and Police Use of Deadly Force, 80 MO. L. REV. 1077,
1077 (2015) (examining the differences between Ferguson and surrounding communities that
may have made Ferguson uniquely ripe for civil unrest, including “aggressive enforcement of
municipal ordinances to generate revenue, inadequate training and supervision related to
police use of force, and a pattern of racial bias in policing” (citing FERGUSON REPORT, supra
note 2, at 2)).
5 See Samuel R. Gross, Errors in Misdemeanor Adjudication, 98 B.U. L. REV. 999, 1009–
10 (2018) (questioning law enforcements’ and prosecutors’ factfinding processes in light of a
study that showed almost eighty percent of misdemeanor exonerations were based on guilty
pleas entered into “without a chemical test for innocence”); see also Alexandra Natapoff,
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2012) (“Most U.S. convictions are
misdemeanors, and they are generated in ways that baldly contradict the standard due
process model of criminal adjudication.”); Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment,
96 B.U. L. REV. 1977, 1999 (2016) (explaining that some appellate courts conceded that
admission of more than five prior convictions “hinted at ‘prosecutorial overkill’ and violations
of due process”).
6 See Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603,
644 (1956) (discussing how certain summary procedure practices deprive defendants of “the
most elementary requirements of a fair hearing”); see also MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE
PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 290–92 (1979)
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criminal justice system and scope of consequences of a conviction
give this topic new urgency.
The Ferguson Report makes plain just how easy it is for poor
people and people of color to amass low-level criminal convictions in
American courts.7 This Report and other sources also demonstrate
how the American system of low-level criminal adjudication
prioritizes mass processing and efficiency over accurate factfinding
and meaningful assignment of moral blameworthiness.8 Ferguson
exposed a single judicial system, but increasing data show the
unreliability and structural unfairness of factfinding in low-level
courts more broadly.9 In a post-Ferguson world, how should courts
evaluate prior conviction evidence when imposing sentences or
determining whether an accused person qualifies for an aggravated
charge as a recidivist? A sentencing judge confronted with a
defendant who has, for example, one (or a few) misdemeanor
convictions from 2013 Ferguson, Missouri has a choice to make.
Traditional theories and practices of sentencing direct the judge to
sentence the defendant more harshly because of the defendant’s
prior criminal record.10 Should the judge automatically apply the
(criticizing rising pretrial costs for frustrating the “adjudicative ideal” and rendering proper
justice unavailable for many criminal defendants).
7 See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 62 (concluding that the Ferguson Police
Department’s racially-driven actions imposed a disparate impact on African Americans); see
also Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV.
731, 749 n.85 (2018) (explaining the Ferguson Report, which found that police “over-enforce
low-level criminal laws and routinely make unjustified arrests that never result in formal
charges”).
8 See generally Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66
STAN. L. REV. 611 (2014) (explaining how “mass misdemeanor” policing induces prosecutors
and courts to process people through quick plea bargaining rather than affording defendants
meaningful opportunities to build a case).
9 See
BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 160 (2011) (examining the errors in the cases of the first 207
wrongfully convicted people to be exonerated by DNA testing and reporting that fifty-three
percent of exonerees took the stand at trial to claim their innocence); see also DNA
Exonerations
in
the
United
States,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Jan.
27, 2020) (reporting that there have been 367 DNA exonerations to date, wrongfully convicted
defendants served an average number of fourteen years in prison, sixty-nine percent of
exonerations involved eyewitness misidentification, forty-four percent involved
misapplication of forensic science, and twenty-eight percent involved false confessions).
10 See ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND 159–62 (2018) (discussing the
“additive imperative” of increasing levels of control and punishment based on prior criminal
justice encounters); see also Alexandra Natapoff, The High Stakes of Low-Level Criminal
Justice, 128 YALE L.J. 1648, 1670–73 (2019); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (laying out the broad considerations when sentencing
defendants).
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relevant sentencing enhancement, whether formal or informal? Or
should the judge allow what she knows about that court at that time
to affect how she evaluates that prior conviction evidence? How
different are other misdemeanor courts? What about the mass
adjudication of immigration offenses?
Courts have long used prior convictions to enhance sentences and
even to upgrade charges.11 Every sentencing guidelines system, for
example, assigns additional aggravating points for prior
convictions.12 This practice rests on the assumptions that (1) prior
convictions accurately reflect past conduct,13 and (2) prior
convictions render the defendant more deserving of punishment for
the crime at hand.14 But as research continues to reveal the
problems of accuracy in the criminal justice system,15 the first of
these assumptions is called ever more directly into question,
especially when the prior conviction was for a minor crime. After
the wave of exonerations based on DNA over the last couple of
decades,16 scholars have begun to focus on the challenges of accurate
factfinding in the lower courts.17
11 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Three-strikes laws provide one example of
this use of prior convictions. See David Schultz, No Joy in Mudville Tonight: The Impact of
“Three Strike” Laws on State and Federal Corrections Policy, Resources, and Crime Control,
9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 557, 558 (2000) (noting that twenty-two states adopted “three
strike” laws, under which a person convicted of three serious felonies would automatically
receive an enhanced sentence); see also, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-1804 (noting that a repeat
offender can receive three times the statutory maximum if the offender has been convicted of
the same or a similar crime twice before).
12 See Nancy J. King, Sentencing and Prior Convictions: The Past, the Future, and the End
of the Prior-Conviction Exception to Apprendi, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 523, 525 n.4 (2014)
(explaining the widespread practice of prior conviction sentence enhancement and giving the
examples of Wisconsin and Florida, where a prior conviction can transform a civil infraction
into a criminal offense and a murder charge to a capital offense, respectively).
13 See Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 565
(2014) (“Yet the most basic assumption of all—the one on which all the others are built—has
received far less attention: the assumption that the conviction is a reliable indicator of the
defendant's relative culpability.”).
14 See USSG ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. (“A defendant with a record of prior criminal
behavior is more culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of greater punishment.”).
On the theoretical debate of whether defendants with prior convictions should be sentenced
more harshly and why (or why not), see Youngjae Lee, Repeat Offenders and the Question of
Desert, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES
(Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010) [hereinafter PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT
SENTENCING], and Michael Tonry, The Questionable Relevance of Previous Convictions to
Punishments for Later Crimes, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING, supra.
15 See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text.
16 See supra note 10.
17 See Natapoff, supra note 5, at 116 (“Lacking evidentiary rigor and adversarial testing,
[the world of low-level criminal adjudication] is a world in which a police officer’s bare decision
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In this context, how should courts assess claims by defendants
that a prior conviction is unreliable, inaccurate, or structurally
unsound? Presumptions of regularity and finality generally have
barred defendants from collaterally challenging a prior conviction.18
Courts have been extremely reluctant to allow for any inquiry into
the procedural validity of a prior conviction, relying instead on the
principle of regularity in using such a criminal history in a
sentencing hearing or at trial of another charge.19 But in light of the
increasing body of scholarship about factual inaccuracies and
procedural irregularities in criminal adjudication,20 this Article
argues that courts should adopt a framework that allows defendants
to mount these collateral attacks more freely. Traditional
assignments of burden of proof should evolve to reflect what we now
know about wrongful convictions and the vagaries of factfinding in
low-level courts. If we take seriously the critiques of our criminal
justice system, we should make the effects of prior convictions less
absolute and allow defendants broader latitude to attack the
fairness and accuracy of prior convictions in subsequent
proceedings.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II examines the research
regarding the lack of procedural safeguards in low-level courts and
how the results in such courts lack reliability. This Part argues that
outcomes in low-level criminal courts more accurately reflect
structural bias than an accurate adjudication of factual guilt. Part
III discusses courts that have looked skeptically at prior conviction
evidence in the sentencing and impeachment contexts and argues
to arrest can lead inexorably, and with little scrutiny, to a guilty plea. It is, in other words, a
world largely lacking in a scrutinized evidentiary basis for guilt and therefore one in which
the risk of wrongful conviction is high.”); Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of
Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (2005) (arguing that the criminal justice
system encourages defendants to remain silent during their proceedings, which paves the
way for governmental overreach); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining
Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 282 (2011)
(questioning the accuracy of factfinding when defendants are routinely pressured to waive
the right to counsel or enter quick guilty pleas without adequate time to consult with an
attorney); see generally Gross, supra note 5.
18 See, e.g., Lackawanna Cty. Dist. Atty. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 402 (2001) (barring certain
collateral attacks on prior convictions based on a “need for finality of convictions and ease of
administration” and noting the multiple other forums that allow defendants to challenge
judgments); United States v. Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d 999, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
Guidelines ‘do not confer upon the defendant any right to attack collaterally a prior conviction
or sentence beyond any such rights otherwise recognized in law.’”(citations omitted)).
19 See Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d at 1001.
20 See supra notes 5–6, 10, 17.
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that the realities of today’s criminal justice system require this more
discerning approach to such evidence. Part IV analyzes the
historical role played by the presumption of regularity and
instances in which this presumption has been overcome. This Part
concludes by proposing a procedural framework by which a court
should consider a defendant’s claim that a prior conviction should
not be considered due to alleged unfairness or unreliability in the
process by which it was obtained. This Part argues that once the
defendant has satisfied the burden of production by making a
credible claim of constitutional invalidity, the prosecution should
bear the burden of persuasion in such a collateral attack.
Ultimately, this Part argues that legislators should consider
exempting misdemeanor convictions from any calculation of
criminal history because of the lack of reliability in those
proceedings. Part V concludes.
II. FAILURES OF MISDEMEANOR COURTS
Many courts reflexively assume that evidence of a defendant’s
prior conviction is necessarily a meaningful criterion to be factored
into the sentencing calculus. But scholars have recently challenged
“the reliability of a conviction as an indicator of relative culpability
[due to] the growing body of data on wrongful convictions . . . and on
disparities in law enforcement, and on the nature and dominance of
plea-bargaining.”21 More broadly, some have begun to challenge the
very notion that the existence of a prior conviction reliably indicates
anything about a defendant’s character.22 Anna Roberts, for
example, argues that courts can no longer assume that a prior
conviction has any meaning relative to a defendant’s character for
truthfulness because of three developments in the criminal justice
system: (1) adversarial collapse, (2) unequal enforcement of

21 See Roberts, supra note 13, at 563 (first citing Montré D. Carodine, “The
Mis-Characterization of the Negro”: A Race Critique of the Prior Conviction Impeachment
Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 526 (2009); and then citing Keith A. Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of
Suspect Evidence: Due Process and Evidentiary Rules in the Age of Innocence, 47 GA. L. REV.
723, 725 (2013)).
22 See id. at 580 (arguing that before using a prior conviction, sentencing courts should
“first investigate whether the conviction is itself a reliable indicator of relative culpability”);
see also Donald H. Zeigler, Harmonizing Rules 609 and 608(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 635, 679 (2003) (“A conviction simply makes it somewhat more
likely the defendant committed the misconduct.”).
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criminal laws, and (3) the widening scope of criminal prosecutions.23
Because low-level courts lack the formal procedural safeguards of
felony courts and because the norms of practice in low-level courts
result in less accurate and reliable outcomes, prior convictions from
these courts should be subject to close scrutiny.
A. PRACTICALITIES: AN INSIGHT INTO TODAY’S MISDEMEANOR
COURTS

Misdemeanor courts have never enjoyed the same degree of
procedural fairness as felony courts.24 Many of those accused of
misdemeanor criminal activity lack the right to court-appointed
counsel.25 Even when the formal right to counsel applies,
misdemeanor courts often are characterized by a shockingly low
standard of practice by defense counsel.26 And of course the federal
constitutional right to a jury also does not apply in many
misdemeanor trials.27
The vastly expanded volume of misdemeanor cases being
processed in American courtrooms has aggravated these formal

See id.
See generally John D. King, Procedural Justice, Collateral Consequences, and the
Adjudication of Misdemeanors in the United States, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 30–33 (E. Luna & M. Wade eds., 2012); KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 10;
Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738 (2017);
Natapoff, supra note 5; see also Jenny Roberts, The Innocence Movement and Misdemeanors,
98 B.U. L. REV. 779, 809–15 (2018).
25 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979) (deciding that the U.S. Constitution did
not require a state trial court to appoint counsel where a defendant was charged with a
statutory offense for which imprisonment upon conviction was authorized but not actually
imposed); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (deciding that the right to counsel
extends only to offenses for which imprisonment would be imposed); see also John D. King,
Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2
(2013) (explaining the arbitrary dichotomy of “petty” and “serious” offenses and the practice
of appointing counsel in misdemeanor cases only if the defendant is actually sentenced to a
period of incarceration).
26 See AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE 257–66 (2009) (describing the lack of monitoring
mechanism “to keep track of the extent of ordinary injustice”); ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET
AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE 31–32 (2009)
(discussing a process that often occurs in misdemeanor courts, known as “meet-and-plead,”
where cases are resolved at the first court hearing with minimal or no preparation by the
defense); King, supra note 24, at 42 (“A recurring and enduring problem in both the
substantive and procedural justice offered by misdemeanor courts is the abysmal state of
indigent misdemeanor representation in many parts of the country.”).
27 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (declaring that petty offenses may
be tried without a jury because only defendants accused of serious crimes are afforded that
right).
23
24
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distinctions.28 The sheer quantity of defendants in these systems
results in a lack of individualized attention to any one case and the
absence of meaningful adversarial process over the long run.29
Finally, it is well-documented that the vagaries of the misdemeanor
adjudication system do not fall randomly across all segments of
society.30 As with virtually every other stage of the criminal justice
system, people of color and poor people are disproportionately
burdened by the inaccuracies and errors of the misdemeanor
adjudication system.31 Those with mental illnesses, too, are more
likely to end up in the low-level criminal courts, as “more than half
of all prison and jail inmates had a mental health problem” and
many of them were incarcerated for misdemeanors like DUI,
larceny, and drug possession.32
When the Ferguson Report was released, it shed light on the
manner in which many criminal cases are resolved in the United
States, bluntly declaring that the City’s “law enforcement practices
are shaped by the City’s focus on revenue rather than by public

28 See Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 7, at 737 (estimating that approximately 13.2
million misdemeanor cases are filed in the United States each year).
29 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
30 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the Disappointing
Right to Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2236 (2013); Robin Walker Sterling, Fundamental
Unfairness: In re Gault and the Road Not Taken, 72 MD. L. REV. 607 (2013).
31 See Roberts, supra note 24, at 822 (explaining how racial disparities are particularly
significant in misdemeanor cases due, in part, to deliberate policing choices linked to
non-white neighborhoods); see also ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME
149–57 (2018).
32 DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006),
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf; see also JENNIFER BRONSON & MARCUS
BERZOFSKY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT:
INDICATORS OF MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS REPORTED BY PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES,
2011–2012, at 6 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/imhprpji1112.pdf (finding that
prisoners incarcerated for property crimes were just as likely to have a mental illness as those
incarcerated for violent offenses); ANNA GUY, AMPLIFYING VOICES OF INMATES WITH
DISABILITIES PRISON PROJECT, LOCKED UP AND LOCKED DOWN: SEGREGATION OF INMATES
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 5 (2016), http://avidprisonproject.org/assets/locked-up-and-lockeddown----avid-prison-project.pdf (showing that the use of segregation in prisons and jails often
exacerbates prisoners’ mental illnesses); Terry Smerling, Opinion, L.A. County Needs to
Construct Mental Health Programs, Not Just Jails, L.A. TIMES (May 4, 2014, 12:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-smerling-mental-illness-jails-20140505story.html (advocating for more treatment programs to keep low-risk offenders with mental
illnesses out of jail and noting that a Miami-Dade misdemeanor diversion program reduced
the recidivism rate from seventy-five percent to twenty percent).
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safety needs.”33 The municipal court in Ferguson was a monument
to revenue collection and seems to have acted more as a collection
agency than anything that could be described as an adversarial
system.34 As of October 2014, the municipal court had 103,000 cases
pending in a town with 21,000 residents.35 Up to 500 people would
appear before the court in a single session.36 The court was not only
physically located within the Ferguson Police Station but was also
overseen by the Ferguson Chief of Police,37 who acted as the direct
supervisor of court staff.38 Most cases, of course, were resolved by
plea,39 as is now true in all American criminal courts.40 The court
clerk was granted the authority to accept guilty pleas and set
bond.41 Although the court was empowered to incarcerate people
found guilty, it rarely did so in the first instance, preferring to
impose fines instead.42 Those who either did not pay their fines on
time or who missed court, however, frequently ended up spending
time in jail as a result.43
The court described in the Ferguson Report bears little
resemblance to the theoretical ideal that law students learn about
in their criminal law and procedure courses. Defendants are
routinely convicted of charges without receiving meaningful notice
and the sheer volume of cases precludes a meaningful opportunity
to be heard.44 Those defendants or their attorneys who do try to
FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
See supra note 3 (describing commentary regarding the Ferguson municipal court and
its focus on generating revenue).
35 FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 6, 9 (providing that as of October 31, 2014, there
were 53,000 traffic and 50,000 non-traffic cases on the court docket).
36 Id. at 9.
37 Id. at 8.
38 See id. (“Court staff report directly to the Chief of Police.”).
39 See id. at 43 (“We have concerns . . . about the trial processes that apply in the rare
occasion that a person does attempt to challenge a charge.”); see also Gaby Del Valle, Most
Criminal Cases End in Plea Bargains, Not Trial, OUTLINE (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://theoutline.com/post/2066/most-criminal-cases-end-in-plea-bargains-nottrials?zd=1&zi=hhhy6uhu (stating that 97% of state level felonies result in a plea).
40 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET 3 tbl.
2,
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-sentencingstatistics/state-district-circuit/2017/dcc17.pdf (providing that 97.2% of criminal cases in fiscal
year 2017 resulted in a guilty plea).
41 FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
42 See id. at 8–9 (providing that the municipal judge has sentenced someone to jail as a
penalty for a violation only once and almost always imposes the monetary penalty instead).
43 See id. at 9 (“As a result, violations that would not normally result in a penalty of
imprisonment can, and frequently do, lead to municipal warrants, arrests, and jail time.”).
44 See id. at 71–88 (providing an overview of the relationship between race and law
enforcement officers).
33
34
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engage in adversarial litigation are punished for it.45 The Report
includes an excerpt of an email from the lead prosecuting attorney
admitting to harsher treatment for defendants whose attorneys
“go[] off on all the constitutional stuff.”46
Although Ferguson presents an extreme example, many of the
dynamics described in the Report will be familiar to those who
appear in low-level courts in the United States. The astounding
volume of cases being processed through such courts makes things
like Brady47 disclosures a rarity, and tales of attorneys—or, more
commonly, their clients—being punished for aggressively litigating
cases in low-level courtrooms are common.48 The Ferguson
municipal judge confirmed that “it is not uncommon for him to add
charges and assess additional fines when a defendant challenges
the citation that brought the defendant into court.”49 With these
45 See id. at 43 (“Attempts to raise legal claims are met with retaliatory conduct.”); see also
Alexa Van Brunt, Opinion, Poor People Rely on Public Defenders Who Are too Overworked to
Defend
Them,
GUARDIAN
(June
17,
2015,
7:30
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/17/poor-rely-public-defenders-toooverworked (“[P]re-trial detainees incur a ‘trial tax’—those who decide to fight their case are
forced to stay in jail longer than those who plead guilty.”).
46 FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 44.
47 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
48 See Beth Schwartzapfel, New York Courts Say: Hand It Over, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov.
8, 2017, 4:20 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/11/08/new-york-courts-sayhand-it-over (stating Brady material is often never disclosed due in part to the fact that
almost all convictions are secured by plea and noting that thirty-eight percent of the 234
exonerations in New York involved Brady violations).
49 FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 49. The Report shows a system driven primarily as
a revenue generator:
In March 2010, for instance, the City Finance Director wrote to Chief
Jackson that “unless ticket writing ramps up significantly before the end of
the year, it will be hard to significantly raise collections next year. . . . Given
that we are looking at a substantial sales tax shortfall, it’s not an
insignificant issue.” Similarly, in March 2013, the Finance Director wrote to
the City Manager: “Court fees are anticipated to rise about 7.5%. I did ask
the Chief if he thought the PD could deliver 10% increase. He indicated they
could try.”
Id. at 2. Of course, the emphasis on revenue generation was passed on to patrol officers. And
as Ferguson’s strategy paid off, it did what any rational profit-maximizing corporation would
do: it expanded. In January 2013, the City Council approved additional municipal court
positions on the basis of the City Manager’s argument that “each month we are setting new
all-time records in fines and forfeitures” and that the increased salaries for court personnel
“will be more than covered by the increase in revenues.” Id. at 9. Most infamously, the Report
describes a Ferguson woman who parked her car illegally in 2007. She received a citation
requiring her to appear in court, a $151 fine, and additional fees. After missing several court
dates, she was charged with seven counts of failure to appear, each of which was accompanied
by an arrest warrant and additional financial penalties and fees. Because of her inability to
pay, she was arrested on warrants on two separate occasions, spent six days in jail, and has
paid $550 to the court. Her case was still open at the time of the release of the Ferguson
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informal norms actually governing the adjudication of
misdemeanors in many courtrooms, it is little wonder that many
defendants choose to exit the system as quickly and quietly as
possible, without contesting the charges against them. As long as
the process costs of adjudicating a misdemeanor exceed the direct
consequences of a conviction, it will continue to be a rare defendant
in most misdemeanor systems who fights their charge by going to
trial.50
B. LACK OF PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which first applied to
state prosecutions in Gideon v. Wainwright,51 was extended to
certain misdemeanors in Argersinger v. Hamlin52 in 1972. Seven
years later, in Scott v. Illinois,53 the United States Supreme Court
limited the reach of the Sixth Amendment to only those
misdemeanors in which the defendant faced the threat of
incarceration.54 As this doctrine developed to categorically exclude
any misdemeanors that did not carry the actual possibility of jail
time, courts and prosecutors quickly realized that they could
streamline the process by “waiving” the possibility of jail time and
proceeding without appointing counsel for indigent defendants.55 By
making the securing of a criminal conviction less costly in terms of
both time and money, courts allowed for the expansion of the mass
processing of low-level convictions.56 Even where defense counsel
Report, and she still owed an additional $541, all from a single instance of illegal parking
that occurred over seven years earlier. See id. at 4.
50 See FEELEY, supra note 6, at 290–92.
51 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
52 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
53 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
54 See id. at 373–74 (deciding that the U.S. Constitution did not require a state trial court
to appoint counsel where a defendant was charged with a statutory offense for which
imprisonment upon conviction was authorized but not actually imposed).
55 Writing separately in Argersinger, Justice Powell foresaw some of the direct and
collateral consequences that would make a simplistic dichotomy between “petty” and
“serious” cases increasingly untenable. 407 U.S. at 47–48 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The
consequences of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief period served under the
sometimes deplorable conditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal record on
employability, are frequently of sufficient magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the label
‘petty.’”).
56 The Ferguson Report details how few of the defendants had court-appointed counsel.
See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 25 (describing how officers frequently made contempt
arrests when they felt disrespected by something subjects said); see also id. at 49
(documenting that courts held defendants in contempt when they merely asked questions
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are present in misdemeanor courtrooms, the standard of practice is
often appallingly low.57 Whether physically present or not, an
ineffective lawyer not only fails her client, but also degrades the
court’s ability to reach accurate, fair, and just results.58 The defense
lawyer has been called the “master key” to unlock the other
mechanisms to promote fair and just adjudication in court.59
Because the Sixth Amendment assures the right to a jury only
for serious offenses, it does not apply to many misdemeanor
offenses.60 In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court rationalized that “the
possible consequences to defendants from convictions for petty
offenses have been thought insufficient to outweigh the benefits to
efficient law enforcement and simplified judicial administration
resulting from the availability of speedy and inexpensive nonjury
adjudications.”61 Each state determines which offenses are
serious,62 but generally serious offenses are those that carry a
penalty of more than six months of incarceration.63 Although some
states provide a broader right to trial by jury than the federal
constitutional right,64 many misdemeanors fall below both state and

during their proceedings and that it was not uncommon for the municipal judge to “add
charges and assess additional fines when a defendant challenge[d] the citation that brought
the defendant into court”).
57 See Van Brunt, supra note 45 (discussing how Washington State’s publicly appointed
defense attorneys spend less than one hour per case and have caseloads of 1,000
misdemeanors per year, which prevents them from conducting core legal functions such as
factual investigations).
58 See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006) (“[R]epresentation by
counsel ‘is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.’” (quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984))).
59 See Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on
“the Most Pervasive Right” of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (1962).
60 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (“It is doubtless true that there is a
category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial
provision . . . .”).
61 Id. at 160.
62 The Duncan Court declined to settle “the exact location of the line between petty
offenses and serious crimes.” Id. at 161.
63 See Blanton v. N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989) (stating that an offense with a
maximum incarceration period of six months is presumptively petty).
64 See State v. Becker, 287 A.2d 580 (Vt. 1972) (providing the right to a jury trial in all
criminal cases, including misdemeanors with no imprisonment penalty); see also Bado v.
United States, 186 A.3d 1243 (D.C. 2018) (guaranteeing the right to a jury trial to defendants
who face a deportation penalty); State ex rel. McDougall v. Strohson, 945 P.2d 1251, 1252–53
(Ariz. 1997) (stating that the court determines whether the right to a jury trial attaches by
assessing the length of potential incarceration, the moral quality of the charged act and the
relationship of the act to common law crimes); State v. Slowe, 284 N.W. 4, 6 (Wis. 1939)
(stating that the right to a jury trial applies to misdemeanor offenses).
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federal thresholds, leaving defendants with the limited options of
either pleading guilty or proceeding with a bench trial.
Considering the scarcity of zealous defense counsel, the
exceedingly rare involvement by a jury, and a vanishingly small
percentage of cases decided by any kind of trial at all, it is difficult
to characterize misdemeanor adjudication as a truly adversarial
system. Contrary to traditional notions that American criminal
justice is reliable because of the strong procedural safeguards in
place to guard against wrongful convictions, the current system of
criminal adjudication has been accurately described as one of
“adversarial collapse.”65 The American Bar Association has
described the state of indigent defense systems in the United States
as “in a state of crisis, resulting in a system that lacks fundamental
fairness and places poor persons at constant risk of wrongful
conviction.”66
Appeals of convictions from misdemeanor courts are very rare. A
recent study estimated that fewer than one in a thousand
misdemeanor convictions is appealed to an intermediate appellate
court.67 This can be attributed in part to the high rate of plea
agreements, in which prosecutors often insist on a defendant’s
waiver of the right to appeal.68 The lack of zealous defense counsel
also contributes to this issue, as many defendants are precluded
from seeking an appeal if their counsel did not preserve certain
objections.69 Without effective counsel, many defendants are
65 See Roberts, supra note 13, at 580 (“[A] growing sense of adversarial collapse, bolstered
by wrongful convictions data, makes increasingly tenuous an unquestioning assumption that
a conviction is itself a reliable indicator of relative culpability.”); see also King, supra note 24,
at 30–33; Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or System Problem?, 2006 WIS.
L. REV. 739, 740 (2006) (“[T]he premise of our adversarial system is that the clash between
partisan advocates produces reliable, accurate results.”); Fred Zacharias, Structuring the
Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 61
(1991) (“When the system breaks down in a significant respect, the codes can no longer expect
competition to achieve adversarially appropriate results.”).
66 ABA STANDING COMM’N ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEF., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE:
AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE—A REPORT ON THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION’S HEARINGS ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 38 (2004).
67 See Nancy J. King & Michael Heise, Misdemeanor Appeals, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1933, 1941
(2019). Even in federal court, defendants appeal only around five percent of misdemeanor
convictions. See JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS, 1999 WITH TRENDS 1985–99, at 1, 3 (2001),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fca99.pdf.
68 See Roberts, supra note 17, at 337 (“[P]rosecutors sometimes insist on a waiver of the
right [to appeal] as part of any plea bargain.”).
69 See id. at 339 (noting the barrier of a petitioner’s failure to raise an issue in an earlier
proceeding).
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unaware either of their right to appeal or of the various filing
deadlines and procedural requirements to note an appeal.70 With so
few charges resolved by trial and even fewer reviewed by an
appellate court, actors in the misdemeanor system are governed
more by informal norms of conduct than by formal rules of
procedure and doctrine.
With so many convictions secured by guilty plea,71 the most
important procedural protection that is often absent in
misdemeanor cases may be the knowing-and-voluntary
requirement for guilty pleas. The United States Supreme Court has
ruled that guilty pleas “not only must be voluntary but must be
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”72 But because of
the woeful state of indigent defense, especially in low-level cases,
many defendants enter guilty pleas with no understanding of the
likely consequences of this action.73 The Court has yet to require
defense counsel to advise defendants of any indirect consequence of
a guilty plea except in the immigration context.74 And given the
realities of low-level practice (and time-served plea offers in the face
of seemingly endless delay), defendants are very unlikely to factor
in future sentencing events when evaluating whether to plead
guilty.75
Of
course,
prior
convictions
that
were
obtained
unconstitutionally may not be used to enhance a criminal sentence
70 See id. at 337–38 (discussing how ineffective counsel limits the opportunities available
to defendants and noting that “individuals who plead guilty in the fast-paced, high-volume
lower criminal courts may not even be aware of the right to appeal . . . .”).
71 See
Emily
Yoffe,
Innocence
Is
Irrelevant,
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171/
(discussing how “estimates for misdemeanor convictions [resulting from guilty pleas] run
even higher” than ninety-seven percent).
72 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
73 See Yoffe, supra note 71 (explaining that defendants accused of misdemeanors often do
not request counsel and that poor defendants who are not able to post bond plead guilty to
avoid waiting in jail for an investigation); see also Jenny Roberts, Informed Misdemeanor
Sentencing, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 171 n.1 (2017) (explaining that misdemeanor sentences
can be as high as ten years and often result in defendants being fired from jobs, barred from
future employment, deported, evicted or refused housing).
74 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (deciding that the distinction between
collateral and direct consequences was ill-suited to the deportation context, so the counsel’s
failure to correctly advise defendant of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea
amounted to constitutionally deficient performance).
75 See Van Brunt, supra note 45 (discussing how pre-trial detainees rarely have more than
a brief conversation with their lawyer before pleading guilty and reach this decision in part
due to the “trial tax”—the fact that those who decide to fight their case stay in jail for longer).
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for a subsequent offense.76 Any criminal conviction with a sentence
involving incarceration secured without either the presence of
counsel or a valid waiver of counsel by the defendant is
unconstitutional.77 A valid waiver of one’s right to counsel must be
done knowingly and intelligently to satisfy constitutional
requirements, and courts should indulge a presumption against
waiver of constitutional rights.78 But if the realities of misdemeanor
practice preclude appellate review of waivers of the right to counsel
and to trial, it is difficult—perhaps impossible—to know when such
waivers were validly given.79
The lack of procedural safeguards in misdemeanor courts
suggests a rate of wrongful convictions higher than the known rate
for felony convictions.80 Lacking recourse to a jury trial, and often
76 See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) (“The admission of a prior criminal
conviction which is constitutionally infirm . . . is inherently prejudicial . . . .”).
77 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (“[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty,
misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”). Of course,
misdemeanor offenses carrying no possibility of incarceration do not confer a constitutional
right to counsel. See id. at 40. (deciding that the right to counsel extends only to offenses for
which imprisonment would be imposed); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979)
(deciding that the Constitution did not require a state trial court to appoint counsel where a
defendant was charged with a statutory offense for which imprisonment upon conviction was
authorized but not actually imposed). A criminal conviction of an unrepresented defendant
in such a case does not require either the presence of counsel or a valid waiver to comply with
constitutional requirements. Id.
78 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (providing that a waiver is an
“intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” but that “‘courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights”
(citations omitted)). This presumption against waiver is especially strong with regard to a
criminal defendant’s right to counsel, which has been described as the “master key.” See John
D. King, Beyond Life and Liberty: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (2013)
(referring to “the right to counsel [as] the ‘master key’ to all of the other rights-protecting and
reliability-ensuring rules of criminal procedure”).
79 See NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM’N, THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED:
AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 85 (Apr.
2009), https://archive.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf. (“[T]here is a shocking disconnect
between the system of justice envisioned by the Supreme Court’s right-to-counsel decisions
and what actually occurs in many of this nation’s courts.”).
80 See Samuel R. Gross, Opinion, The Staggering Number of Wrongful Convictions in
America, WASH. POST (July 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-cost-ofconvicting-the-innocent/2015/07/24/260fc3a2-1aae-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html
[hereinafter Gross, Wrongful Convictions in America] (“The problem may be worst at the low
end of the spectrum, in misdemeanor courts where almost everybody pleads guilty. . . . In the
past year, 45 defendants were exonerated after pleading guilty to low-level drug
crimes . . . .”); see also Samuel R. Gross, Race and Wrongful Convictions in the United States,
NAT’L
REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS
(Mar.
7,
2017),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Race_and_Wrongful_Convictions.
pdf [hereinafter Gross, Race and Wrongful Convictions] (“Misdemeanor convictions
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without the assistance of counsel, a person charged with a
misdemeanor has powerful incentives to plead guilty regardless of
the evidence in the case or the defendant’s factual guilt or
innocence.81 An offer to plead guilty to a misdemeanor with no
additional jail time can make the prospect irresistible.82 And the
millions of misdemeanor convictions83 that are secured by guilty
plea each year are never subjected to any meaningful adversarial
testing.84 Without these procedural safeguards, the reliability and
accuracy of outcomes in low-level courts is questionable.
C. UNRELIABILITY IN ADJUDICATING GUILT

Logic and experience dictate that many misdemeanor convictions
are obtained with little regard to the facts of the case or the
applicable law.85 In his essay, Errors in Misdemeanor Adjudication,
Samuel Gross describes some categories of known misdemeanor
exonerations, in which the vast majority of defendants opted for a
quick guilty plea with little direct punishment over the prospect of
a more protracted process.86 One typical scenario is a felony that
“falls apart and is dumped by a prosecutor who offers the defendant

outnumber felonies by at least four to one, but account for less than four percent of
exonerations . . . . Clearly, only a tiny fraction of innocent defendants who are convicted of
misdemeanors or non-violent felonies are ever exonerated.” (citations omitted)).
81 See Gross, Wrongful Convictions in America, supra note 80 (“Why then did they plead
guilty? As best we can tell, most were held in jail because they couldn’t make bail. When they
were brought to court for the first time, they were given a take-it-or-leave-it, for-today-only
offer: Plead guilty and get probation or weeks to months in jail. If they refused, they’d wait
in jail for months, if not a year or more, before they got to trial, and risk additional years in
prison if they were convicted. That’s a high price to pay for a chance to prove one’s
innocence.”).
82 See Gross, supra note 5, at 1004 (“Hundreds of thousands of defendants plead guilty
every year to avoid pre-trial detention for . . . misdemeanors. Why wouldn’t they? They may
face months in jail waiting for trial, but get weeks or days—or no time at all—if they plead
guilty.”).
83 See Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 7, at 737 (estimating approximately 13.2 million
misdemeanor cases are filed each year in the United States).
84 See Gross, supra note 5, at 1004–05 (“Plea bargaining is the great American method of
sweeping problems in criminal cases under the rug. The defendant’s constitutional rights
were violated? No problem; offer him a good enough deal, he’ll plead guilty, and that’ll be the
end of it. The evidence of guilt stinks? If you reduce the charges enough, he’ll probably go for
it, and we’ll never have to present any evidence.”).
85 See id. at 999 (“There’s every reason to worry that many defendants who are convicted
of misdemeanors, usually by guilty pleas, are innocent—but there are hardly any data that
speak to that issue.”).
86 See id. at 1009–10 (discussing the case of Harris County, Texas supporting the
conclusion many defendants accused of misdemeanors accepted guilty plea offers).
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a no-time misdemeanor plea bargain.”87 One judge described the
defendant who accepted such an offer as having “just bought an
insurance policy.”88
The vast majority of criminal convictions are obtained by plea
rather than by adversarial testing at trial.89 Because of the
breakdown in real adversarialism in criminal cases, some have
argued that the “assumption of reliability [of criminal convictions]
needs to be reexamined.”90 Indeed, the system has evolved in the
past half century91 to embrace efficiency and mass processing,
sacrificing accuracy and reliability of outcomes as a result.92 Anna
Roberts additionally cites the inadequate provision and quality of
defense counsel as negatively impacting reliability, stating that “the
kind of representation that can help to ensure reliability is often
lacking.”93 The modern nature of plea bargaining, with so much of
the power in the hands of the prosecutor, further undercuts claims
of reliability.94 Various strong pressures encourage defendants
Id. at 1001.
Id. One of the more illuminating categories of known misdemeanor exonerations
concerns those charged with misdemeanor drug possession for substances later determined
not to be drugs. Id. at 1009–10. During the data collection period Gross describes, only one
jurisdiction had the practice of testing suspected illegal substances after the defendant
entered a plea of guilty to possessing them. Id. In at least fifty-eight instances in this county,
defendants opted for a quick misdemeanor guilty plea to drug possession at their first court
appearance even when the substance in question was not illegal drugs. Id. Eventually, after
testing the suspected substances, the prosecutor’s office secured exonerations for those
defendants. Id. Regardless, these cases demonstrate innocent people’s willingness to opt for
a quick conviction instead of a lengthy pre-trial process, the likelihood of pre-trial detention,
and an uncertain outcome at trial. Id. at 1003–04.
89 See Roberts, supra note 13, at 578 (“[I]n most cases the convictions will have been
garnered through a guilty plea . . . .”); see also Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions:
Rethinking the Search for Truth, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911, 912 (2011) (“The current
American system is marked by an adversary process so compromised by imbalance between
the parties—in terms of resources and access to evidence—that true adversary testing is
virtually impossible.”).
90 Roberts, supra note 13, at 581.
91 Almost a half century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that “the volume of
misdemeanor cases, far greater in number than felony prosecutions, may create an obsession
for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the result.” Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 34 (1972).
92 See Findley, supra note 89, at 912 (“If one were asked to start from scratch and devise
a system best suited to ascertaining the truth in criminal cases, . . . what would that system
look like? It is inconceivable that one would create a system bearing much resemblance to the
criminal justice process that we now have in the United States.”).
93 Roberts, supra note 13, at 581.
94 See id. at 582 nn.148–49 (“Plea bargains can be swiftly accomplished, and countless
pressures push defendants toward this outcome.” (first citing Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon
Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1049, 1072, 1081–82 (2013); and then citing Jenny
Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1093–94 (2013))).
87
88
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toward guilty pleas regardless of guilt in low-level cases, and “the
adversarial truth-seeking process . . . has become increasingly
irrelevant.”95 Because of the heightened pressures toward quick
resolution and the lack of procedural safeguards in low-level courts,
misdemeanor convictions are likely far less reliable than felony
convictions.96
Of course, the unfairness of America’s criminal courts is not
evenly or randomly distributed. Notwithstanding decades of
rhetoric targeting racial and economic disparities in the criminal
justice system, people of color and poor people continue to bear the
brunt of a structurally unfair system.97 Federal rates of
incarceration are almost twice as high for Latinos, and more than
five times higher for African Americans, than for white Americans.98
Among those convicted, people of color are sentenced to periods of
Roberts cites the trial tax, delay, and fear of factfinder bias as reasons that a defendant might
choose a plea bargain regardless of factual guilt or innocence. Id. at 582–83.
95 See Natapoff, supra note 94, at 1071 (arguing that “the misdemeanor system burdens
and pressures defendants regardless of the evidence, their rights, or their culpability”); see
also Darryl K. Brown, American Prosecutors’ Powers and Obligations in the Era of Plea
Bargaining (“[W]hen pleas replace trials, most of the systemic components of public
adjudication that serve the objectives of factual reliability and accurate normative judgment
are missing—the jury, evidentiary disclosure, rules of evidence, formal adversarial challenges
to state evidence, and so on.”), in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 24, at 200, 204; Roberts, supra note 13, at 584 (“[F]ar from a fair fight, the
conviction-production process is often a scramble to grab the least bad option before the risk
of trial. It would be a miracle if the results were reliable.”).
96 See Roberts, supra note 13, at 584–85 (stating that misdemeanor convictions have a
“shaky foundation” because misdemeanors are generally not subject to investigation); see also
King, supra note 24, at 30–33 (describing how the danger of wrongful convictions in
misdemeanors lies in the “nonfeasance, rather than the misfeasance or malfeasance, of the
prosecutor”); Gross, Race and Wrongful Convictions, supra note 80, at 17 (providing that
misdemeanor convictions outnumber felonies by four to one, but account for less than four
percent of exonerations and concluding that “[c]learly, only a tiny fraction of innocent
defendants who are convicted of misdemeanors or non-violent felonies are ever exonerated”).
97 See, e.g., CATHERINE V. BEANE, MOVING TOWARD A MORE INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO
JUSTICE REFORM 2 (Feb. 2008) (“A defining characteristic of America’s criminal justice system
is its disproportionate impact on the poor and people of color . . . .”); see generally ALEXANDER,
supra note 30 (arguing that the American criminal justice system acts as a modern-day
system of racial control); COLE, supra note 30 (contending that constitutional protections from
police power are not extended to minorities and the poor).
98 See Carol A. Brook, Racial Disparity Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 35 LITIG.
15, 15 (2008) (“In federal prison, people of color make up almost 75 percent of the prison
population, although they constitute only 25 percent of the U.S. population. Worse,
African-Americans alone make up almost 40 percent of the federal prison population,
although they constitute only 13 percent of our country's population.”); see also Criminal
Justice Fact Sheet, NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,
https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (“In 2014,
African Americans constituted 2.3 million, or 34%, of the total correctional
population . . . [and] are incarcerated at more than 5 times the rate of whites.”).

946

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:927

incarceration approximately twenty-five percent longer than white
defendants.99
Eisha Jain criticizes a focus on “exceptional” cases that might
warrant relief, arguing that our focus instead should be on the
“typical” misdemeanor prosecution and the unfair way that it is
adjudicated.100 Misdemeanor offenses are often the easiest cases to
prove in that they “typically ‘lack robust mens rea requirements,’
meaning that they are designed to ease the path of prosecution.”101
Misdemeanor cases are generally staffed by the least experienced
prosecutors and defense lawyers.102 And misdemeanors are seen as
“disposable” in that everyone involved wants to dispose of them
quickly.103
It is not much of an exaggeration to state that criminal procedure
matters very little in the adjudication of misdemeanors.104 Jain
explains that
the procedural hurdles meant to ensure a fair process
either do not exist or do not work as intended in the
misdemeanor
context.
Misdemeanants
get
a
watered-down version of the doctrinal protections that
apply to felonies. Defendants are not entitled to counsel
or jury trials in all low-level cases.105
And even where those protections are theoretically or doctrinally
present, the realities of misdemeanor prosecution render them
unavailable or illusory in practice.106 Misdemeanor courts sort
99 See Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Rita, District Court Discretion, and Fairness in
Federal Sentencing, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 57 (2007) (discussing the sentencing gap between
African Americans and other groups).
100 See Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L. REV. 953, 955
(2018) (arguing that relief efforts should account for the systemic unfairness in the
misdemeanor process).
101 See id. at 956 (quoting Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1358–59).
102 See id. (“They are staffed by the least experienced lawyers or even with no lawyers at
all.”).
103 See id. at 956–57 (“The cases are considered ‘disposable’ in every sense of the word:
lawyers are trained to dispose of them quickly, and defendants themselves have powerful
perceived incentives to resolve them quickly.”).
104 See id. at 959 (“None of this [criminal procedure] amounts to much in misdemeanor
courts.”).
105 Id.
106 See id. (explaining that obtaining legal counsel is often practically inaccessible because
“[m]any jurisdictions charge fees for court-appointed attorneys” and “overworked defense
attorneys . . . provide no meaningful advice”).
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people into two categories with little regard either for legal guilt or
moral blameworthiness.107 Although this lack of rigorous testing
and factual accuracy might be defended on the grounds of “low
stakes,”108 the ever-expanding network of collateral consequences
makes that argument less and less tenable every day. Every
subsequent sentence enhancement or application of a recidivist
statute may compound the arbitrariness and structural unfairness
of misdemeanor courts.
III. INFORMED SKEPTICISM OF PRIOR CONVICTION EVIDENCE
In a misdemeanor courtroom, it can seem that the short-term
interests of all parties are in a quick resolution: a guilty plea with a
time-served sentence. Such a resolution terminates the case quickly
and efficiently. The judge moves a case off of her docket, the
prosecutor secures a conviction, and the defendant is out of jail and
home. Courts evaluating these convictions at later sentencing
events, however, must take a longer-term view and ascribe meaning
to each conviction, asking whether, and to what extent, those
convictions justify harsher punishment. Rather than unthinkingly
tallying up each prior conviction on a predetermined grid,109 courts
should conduct a more searching inquiry into whether a particular
prior conviction reliably speaks to the moral culpability and
criminal history of the defendant.
A. RACE

People of color are disproportionately implicated at every stage
of the American criminal justice system.110 U.S. District Court
Judge Nancy Gertner took account of the potential impact of race
on prior convictions when she sentenced Alexander Leviner, a
107 See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 10, at 223 (“[L]ower criminal courts are not
primarily adjudicative, merely processing people by resolving criminal cases.”); see also King,
supra note 24, at 3 (arguing that the misdemeanor process sorts defendants “into two groups,
not on the basis of guilt or innocence, but rather on their willingness to pay the ‘process costs’
of an overburdened system” (citing FEELEY, supra note 6, at 290–92)).
108 But see Roberts, supra note 73, at 171 (“There is no such thing as a low-stakes
misdemeanor.”).
109 See, e.g., Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25, 27 (2005) (arguing that the Sentencing Guidelines dehumanize
offenders by mechanically inserting certain variables into a formula and scoring punishments
on a two-dimensional grid).
110 See, e.g., Sterling, supra note 30, at 660–62.
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defendant with a long history of convictions for petty offenses.111
Leviner pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.112
In calculating his criminal history score, Judge Gertner noted that
a technically accurate calculation of Leviner’s criminal history score
placed him in Criminal History Category V, the second-highest
category in the system, even though his criminal record mostly
consisted of motor vehicle offenses and minor drug possession
charges.113 His only conviction for a crime of violence was a
sixteen-year-old conviction for assault, which occurred when
Leviner was seventeen years old.114
Stating that the Guidelines were “not to be applied
mechanistically” and that the court would not ignore “fairness” or
“logic,” Judge Gertner concluded that the criminal history
calculation overstated the defendant’s culpability and sentenced
Leviner as if he were in a lower criminal history category.115
Judge Gertner found that accepting the initial calculations would
“replicate disparities in state sentencing” and exacerbate racial
disparities in traffic stops and arrests of people of color.116 Further,
not only were many of Leviner’s convictions for driving after his
license was suspended, but also he was sentenced to either
suspended or active jail time in each of them, which drove his
criminal history score higher still.117 The offenses became
“countable” as prior criminal history because Leviner received more
than thirty days of imprisonment.118 Again, Judge Gertner
wondered aloud about the impact of race: “[W]ithout knowing the
111 United States v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23, 25 (D. Mass. 1998) (“[W]hile Leviner has a
relatively long record, it consists almost entirely of motor vehicle offenses, and minor drug
possession charges.”).
112 Id. at 24.
113 Id. at 25.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 24 (“[E]ven more profound concerns are raised where, as here, the defendant is
African American, the convictions were largely motor vehicle offenses, for which the
defendant was imprisoned. The scholarly and popular literature strongly suggests that there
is racial disparity in the rates at which African American are stopped and prosecuted for
traffic offenses. That literature, together with the specific facts about Leviner’s record and
background, compel me to depart from the Guideline range.”).
117 See id. at 28–29 (explaining that additional points will be added to the criminal history
if the defendant has experienced a prior sentence of imprisonment of certain durations (citing
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018))).
118 See id. at 33 (“[T]hese stops evolved into ‘countable’ offenses under the Guidelines only
because they were offenses for which Leviner received more than thirty days’
imprisonment.”).
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specific facts surrounding each sentence, this record raises concerns
at the very least. Would others have received the same sentence who
were similarly situated . . . ?”119 She considered several scholarly
sources on the racial disparities in the rate at which people of color
are stopped, charged, prosecuted, and aggressively sentenced for
criminal offenses.120 Ultimately, Judge Gertner concluded that to
count each of Leviner’s prior criminal convictions as the Guidelines
dictate would only replicate and magnify prior racial disparities in
sentencing Leviner for the felon-in-possession charge, and she
departed downward from the Guideline range and sentenced
Leviner as if he were in a lower criminal history category.121
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, like many state guideline
systems,122 explicitly forbid the consideration of race in
sentencing.123 In section 5H1.10, the U.S. Sentencing Commission
declares that race is “not relevant in the determination of a
sentence.”124 If this is understood as mandating a “race-blind”
approach to sentencing, however, the result will only replicate,
exacerbate, and magnify the racism that has already occurred in
prior interactions between defendants of color and the criminal
justice system.125 The legislative history to the act establishing the
guidelines seems to take a more nuanced view, setting forth that
“[t]he requirement of neutrality with regard to such factors [as race]
Id.
Id.
121 Id. at 25. Judge Nancy Gertner later explained her decision in the Leviner case:
The guidelines’s emphasis on criminal history enhances whatever inequities
were embodied in past sentences. I sentenced a man for the crime of “felon
in possession of a firearm,” whose criminal record scored high on the
guidelines. When I looked closely, I noticed that all the scored offenses were
nonviolent, traffic offenses—for instance, driving after his license was
suspended. And then I wondered: Since no other traffic offense accompanied
the license charges, how did the man get stopped? I strongly suspected
“Driving While Black.” I departed downward, refusing to give literal credit
to the record.”
Nancy Gertner, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A View from the Bench, 29 HUM. RTS. 6, 23
(2002).
122 See, e.g., MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2.D.2 (MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COMM’N 2019) (forbidding race to be considered as a basis for departing from a presumptive
sentence); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-801(b)(3) (2019) (“Sentencing criteria should be neutral
with respect race . . . .”).
123 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.10 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018)
(explaining that race is not a relevant factor to the determination of a sentence).
124 Id.
125 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Blindsight: The Absurdity of Color-Blind Criminal
Justice, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 8 (2007) (discussing the “ability to foresee the future racial
consequences of the criminal justice system choices that we make today”).
119
120

950

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:927

is not a requirement of blindness.”126 By distilling this guidance into
a flat statement that race is “not relevant,” however, the Sentencing
Commission dangerously oversimplifies how previous racial bias
and disparity should be factored into sentencing decisions.127
B. CITIZENSHIP

Immigration-related offenses are—like the traffic offenses at
issue in Leviner—another area in which convictions are generated
at high volume and through increasingly informal procedure.128
Immigration-related prosecutions have come to predominate in
many federal criminal courtrooms and have become the subject of
creative procedural shortcuts.129 Because of the high volume of cases
in many dockets, these cases can be among the most egregious in
lacking due process and fundamental fairness.130
One description of such a courtroom—a federal district court in
the District of Arizona—challenges traditional notions of how
criminal convictions are secured in American courts:
U.S. District Court Judge Leslie Bowman’s court had
been in session for less than 14 minutes, but as usual,
it had been a busy 14. She’d already deported eight
Central American men and was seconds away from
deporting six more, who stood nervously before
her. . . . Most [of these men] faced misdemeanor charges
for illegal entry into the U.S., and [Judge] Bowman was
preparing to dismiss the cases and order them deported.
But for Guatemalan immigrant Manuel Lux-Tom, it
was different. This was his second time being caught
crossing the border, and federal officials who wanted
him in jail were insisting that Lux-Tom stand trial at a
Brook, supra note 98, at 18 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 1984 U.S.S.C.A.N. 3354 n.409).
USSG § 5H1.10.
128 See Miriam Jordan, Swift Frontier Justice for Migrants Brought to Federal Courts, N.Y.
TIMES (June 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/us/border-immigrationcourts.html (explaining how President Trump’s zero-tolerance policy has swiftly flooded
southern criminal courthouses, with nearly sixty percent of all criminal prosecutions in April
2018 for immigration violations).
129 See id. (describing the Bush-created Operation Streamline as “assembly-line justice”
because of the common mass multiple-defendant proceedings and how due process might be
undermined by this rush to convict).
130 See id. (quoting the executive director of Federal Defenders of San Diego, who said that
“providing meaningful representation becomes all but impossible”).
126
127
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later date when the court could handle his case.
Lux-Tom’s attorney, Richard Bacal, objected. Bacal
argued [that] his client had been the victim of a rigged
and unfair system during his previous trial in Pecos,
Texas. In that case, Bacal said, Lux-Tom had never
talked to an attorney alone—he’d only seen one in a
group meeting along with 20 other men being detained.
No one had asked Lux-Tom, who speaks his native
language of K’iche’, if he needed or wanted a translator,
and he’d been found guilty with literally no idea what
was happening, Bacal argued.131
Like many of those being processed through federal courtrooms
on the southern border, Lux-Tom spoke neither English nor
Spanish.132 But he was not provided an interpreter in a language
that he understood.133 Judge Bowman responded to Lux-Tom’s
objection with striking candor, acknowledging “that a person could
probably make it through the proceedings without a thorough
understanding of their rights and the court proceedings.”134
The ease with which a criminal defendant could be convicted
with no knowledge of the meaning of the proceedings escalated in
2005 with the introduction of Operation Streamline, which reduced
procedural safeguards and enabled courts to process people at a
“breakneck pace.”135 In such cases, prosecutors frequently offer a
time-served sentence in exchange for a quick guilty plea.136 As with
all kinds of misdemeanors, this result can seem like a win for all
131 John Stanton, The Courts Where Some Immigrants Plead Guilty Without Knowing
What’s
Happening,
BUZZFEED
NEWS
(July
11,
2018),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/johnstanton/immigration-border-operationstreamline-due-process.
132 Id. (“Though the men had been given interpreter headsets, they were largely
ceremonial: None of the men spoke English or enough Spanish to participate in the hearing.”).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.; see also Ted Robbins, Border Patrol Program Raises Due Process Concerns, NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(Sept.
13,
2010),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129780261
(discussing
the
implementation and effects of Operation Streamline); Fernanda Santos, Detainees Sentenced
in Seconds in ‘Streamline’ Justice on Border, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/us/split-second-justice-as-us-cracks-down-on-bordercrossers.html (explaining some people may be sentenced in as little as twenty-five seconds).
136 See Yoffe, supra note 71 (explaining how the bureaucratic system encourages poor
people who cannot pay bond to plead guilty and get time served rather than remain in jail
while the misdemeanor is investigated).
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involved: the courts move cases along quickly, the prosecutors boast
high conviction rates, and the defendants get to quickly dispose of
the case with no further immediate consequences.137 As Judge
Bowman suggested, it is not difficult to imagine such a system
processing people along so quickly that those being convicted have
little or no understanding of what is happening.
C. CLASS

A final irrationality in using prior convictions to enhance
sentences concerns the extent to which the prior length of
incarceration increases a defendant’s criminal history score, as it
does in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and various state systems.
As a close look at misdemeanor practice illustrates, this practice
punishes poverty far more than it reflects criminal culpability or
amenability to rehabilitation.138
In United States v. Yuselew,139 the defendant received a one-point
increase in his criminal history score for a prior “conviction for
patronizing a prostitute.”140 The Guidelines specifically exempt
prostitution convictions from criminal history calculations, unless
such a conviction carried a sentence of “a term of imprisonment of
at least thirty days.”141 At his arraignment on the
patronizing-a-prostitute charge, Yuselew was given a $100 cash
137 See id. (“Ideally, plea bargains work like this: Defendants for whom there is clear
evidence of guilt accept responsibility for their actions; in exchange, they get leniency. A
time-consuming and costly trial is avoided, and everybody benefits.”). It is not clear that a
system that more rigorously protected defendants’ rights would be preferable to those
defendants:
Before [Operation] Streamline, immigrants who had already been deported
at least once faced felony charges that could bring up to two years in jail,
often on top of the weeks or months they would spend awaiting trial. But
under Streamline, detention can be as short as [thirty-six] hours before they
are deported. And given chronic complaints about the conditions in long-term
immigration detention centers like the West Texas Detention center dubbed
Hell by detainees, that can mean a lot for many immigrants.
Stanton, supra note 131.
138 See Roberts, supra note 13, at 596–97 n.255 (providing that time served sentences are
imposed on defendants who are “too poor to pay bond,” and therefore using sentence length
as a component of impeachment might allow defendant to be impeached by their own poverty
(citing Motion for Departure, Objections to Presentence Report and Sentencing
Memorandum, United States v. Yuselew, No. CR 09-1035 JB, 2010 WL 4854683 (D.N.M. Aug.
5, 2010))).
139 Yuselew, 2010 WL 3834418.
140 Id. at *2.
141 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(c)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018).
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bond.142 But because he could not post the bond, he remained in
pre-trial detention.143 Forty-four days later, Yuselew was brought
before the judge, entered a plea of guilty, and was sentenced to the
time he had already served.144 At his subsequent federal sentencing,
Yuselew argued that this time-served sentence should not factor
into his criminal history calculation, as he had not been sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days.145
After initially opposing Yuselew’s request to exclude the
patronizing-a-prostitute charge, the prosecution withdrew its
opposition during the sentencing hearing due to a “lack of clarity in
the documents” regarding whether Yuselew received “a time served
sentence or a deferred sentence.”146 The court nevertheless
addressed Yuselew’s objection to the criminal history calculation
and stated that it “would be inclined to conclude that a time-served
sentence is a term of imprisonment” and therefore to overrule
Yuselew’s objection to the inclusion of the prior conviction for
patronizing a prostitute.147 In its discussion of the issue, the court
made no mention of the economic disparities that would result from
including time-served sentences like Yuselew’s in criminal history
calculations.148
Yuselew’s case illustrates how irrational disparities in
misdemeanor sentencing practices can be magnified in subsequent
sentencing decisions. But for Yuselew’s indigency, he certainly
would have posted the $100 bond to secure his own freedom in the
misdemeanor prostitution case. Because of his poverty, however, he
was penalized, both by having to spend that time in pre-trial
detention and by the additional criminal history point assessed at
Yuselew, 2010 WL 3834418, at *3.
See id. (“The bond was never posted, and Yuselew remained in prison.”).
144 See id. (stating that Yuselew plead guilty and was given a deferred judgment on October
24, 2007).
145 See id. (explaining Yuselew’s argument that patronizing a prostitute is similar to the
offense of prostitution which is excluded from criminal history calculations).
146 Id. at *5 (explaining that ambiguity in Yuselew’s previous plea because if the sentence
was deferred, then no portion of it could have been served which would provide “no basis to
find that the term of imprisonment was at least thirty days”).
147 Id. at *13; see also United States v. Staples, 202 F.3d 992, 998 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Time
served is real time and time suspended is not.”); Roberts, supra note 13, at 597 n.255 (citing
Motion for Departure, Objections to Presentence Report and Sentencing Memorandum, supra
note 139)). But see United States v. Buter, 229 F.3d 1077, 1078 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding
that a time served sentence on misdemeanor convictions does not qualify as a sentence to a
term of imprisonment); United States v. Hall, 531 F.3d 414, 419 (6th Cir. 2008) (same).
148 See Roberts, supra note 13, at 599 (“[R]eliance on prior sentences can magnify
disparities based on race or poverty.”).
142
143
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his later sentencing—a point that raised his presumptive
sentencing range from 210–262 months to 235–293 months, an
increase of more than two years.149
The common misdemeanor practice of time-served sentences has
very little bearing on the seriousness of the offense. Instead, it bears
more on the degree to which the court is overburdened and whether
the defendant in question can gather the funds necessary to secure
her freedom prior to the resolution of the case. Without knowing the
details of a particular court’s practices, one reasonably may
conclude that, had Mr. Yuselew posted bond immediately upon his
arraignment, whether after four days or forty-four days, he would
have received the same sentence: time already served. But because
of section 4A1.2(c)(1), poor defendants are sentenced more harshly
for these prior offenses, solely on account of their poverty.
The shortcuts and mistakes in misdemeanor court do not, of
course, affect all groups equally. People of color and poor people are
convicted at disproportionately high rates.150 Because of the
disparate rate of conviction based on class and race, an uncritical
application of prior conviction evidence merely compounds and
aggravates the layers of bias that already exist in the system.151
Given this backdrop, judges and prosecutors have an ethical duty to
inquire into the reliability of prior convictions before using them to
enhance a sentence or upgrade a charge.152 Failure to look critically
at these convictions is to accept the introduction of evidence skewed
by racial and economic bias into yet another level of the criminal
justice system.153 Because we know that racial disparities exist at

149 See Motion for Departure, Objections to Presentence Report and Sentencing
Memorandum, supra note 139, at *4.
150 See, e.g., Victoria Bekiempis, Why Do NYC’s Minorities Still Face So Many Misdemeanor
Arrests?, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 28, 2015, 12:11 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/nypd-racearrest-numbers-309686 (stating that minorities comprised eighty-six percent of misdemeanor
arrests in New York City in 2014).
151 See Roberts, supra note 13, at 576 (“[D]ue to uneven distributions of criminal
convictions, and because of race-based assumptions of guilt, [consideration of prior conviction
evidence] disproportionately affects people of color.” (first citing ALEXANDER, supra note 30,
at 7; then citing Montre Carodine, Keeping It Real: Reforming the “Untried Conviction”
Impeachment Rule, 69 MD. L. REV. 501, 536 (2010); and then citing Stephen Fortunato,
Judges, Racism, and the Problem of Actual Innocence, 57 ME. L. REV. 481, 504 (2005))).
152 See Roberts, supra note 13, at 600–03 (describing the ethical obligation for judges and
prosecutors to think critically about racial disparities before introducing a criminal
defendant’s record).
153 See Carodine, supra note 151, at 514 (“[T]here are enough serious flaws in the system
as a whole that we should not compound the criminal justice system’s mistakes by using
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every level of the criminal justice system, we should be skeptical
about ascribing meaning to data concerning prior convictions.154
IV. A PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSIGNING WEIGHT TO
LOW-LEVEL PRIOR CONVICTIONS
Sentencing courts are reluctant to allow defendants to challenge
the validity of prior convictions as a part of the sentencing
proceeding, and there is little clear law that would compel them to
do so.155 Wary of endless litigation by criminal defendants and in
search of finality, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that,
when collaterally attacked, “the judgment of a court carries with it
a presumption of regularity.”156 This is true even when the prior
conviction was obtained in the absence of defense counsel.157
Because of the unreliability of convictions from low-level courts,
however, sentencing judges should adopt a new framework to
account for this reality. Courts should be more open to considering
challenges to prior convictions. Moreover, courts and legislatures
should consider categorically exempting low-level convictions from
consideration in calculating criminal histories and applying
sentencing enhancements.
A. THE CONTOURS OF THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY

The “presumption of regularity” allows sentencing courts to rely
on prior convictions as presumptively valid.158 The presumption is
convictions as evidence in subsequent cases, or we should at least view prior convictions
offered into evidence with much more skepticism.”).
154 See Roberts, supra note 13, at 585–86 (“[M]arked disparities in enforcement necessarily
call into question any suggestion that a conviction is a reliable indicator of relative
culpability.”).
155 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.4(f), at 772 (2d ed. 1999) (“[D]ue
process does not mandate the opportunity during sentencing to challenge prior convictions
for most sorts of constitutional invalidity.”).
156 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468–69 (1938).
157 See id. (“Where a defendant, without counsel, acquiesces in a trial resulting in his
conviction and later seeks release by the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus, the burden
of proof rests upon him to establish that he did not competently and intelligently waive his
constitutional right to assistance of counsel.”).
158 Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992) (quoting Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 468). State and
federal courts widely use the presumption of regularity, although they differ regarding the
manner and extent to which the defendant bears a burden of production in rebutting that
presumption. See, e.g., State v. McCann, 21 P.3d 845, 846, 849 (Ariz. 2001) (providing that “a
rebuttable presumption of regularity attaches to prior convictions used to enhance a sentence
or as an element of a crime” but that a defendant may challenge the presumption with “some
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rebuttable, and courts have adopted procedural frameworks for
adjudicating claims that a prior conviction should not be used to
enhance punishment due to its constitutional invalidity.159 Courts
generally apply a rebuttable presumption of regularity to the prior
conviction, and the defendant must satisfy an initial burden of
production through presentation of evidence that the prior
conviction was invalid.160 Whether the state or defendant bears the
ultimate burden of persuasion varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.161
In Burgett v. Texas,162 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a
conviction obtained in a trial at which the defendant was impeached
with a prior forgery conviction that had been obtained in violation
of the defendant’s right to counsel.163 In holding that the
impeachment of the defendant with his prior uncounseled
conviction was error, the Court explained:
To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v.
Wainwright to be used against a person either to
support guilt or to enhance punishment for another
offense is to erode the principle of that case. Worse yet,
since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the

credible evidence”); Rose v. State, 563 S.E.2d 865, 868 (Ga. 2002) (explaining that the
presumption of regularity attaches to prior conviction upon showing that a defendant pled
guilty and was represented by counsel, after which the defendant bears the burden of
producing “some affirmative evidence” of irregularity to rebut the presumption).
159 See, e.g., State v. Elling, 463 N.E.2d 668, 670 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1983) (placing the entire
burden on the prosecution), abrogation recognized by State v. Mullins, No. 99CA15, 1999 WL
668812 (Ohio Ct. App. July 29, 1999); Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834, 837 (Colo. 1982)
(placing the burden of production on the defendant and the burden of persuasion on the
prosecution); Kelley v. People, 4 N.E. 644, 645–46 (Ill. 1886) (barring defendants from
challenging prior convictions altogether).
160 See Watkins, 655 P.2d at 837 (requiring the defendant to produce evidence that a
conviction was invalid after which the burden shifts to the prosecution); see also
State v. O'Neil, 580 P.2d 495, 497–98 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (“Defendant has the burden of
producing evidence . . . that his prior convictions are invalid . . . . Once such evidence is
produced, the State has the burden of persuasion as to the validity of the prior
convictions.”); State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989) (explaining that the burden is
first “on the defendant to raise the issue and produce some evidence” and that “the burden
[then] shifts to the State”).
161 See generally State v. Okland, 941 P.2d 431 (Mont. 1997) (providing an example of a
state’s procedural framework and citations to other states’ frameworks).
162 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
163 See generally id.
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right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from
the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right.164
The Court, however, restricted the scope of Burgett in Custis v.
United States.165 In that case, the Court rejected the defendant’s
argument that he should have been allowed to contest the validity
of two prior state-court convictions in his federal sentencing under
the Armed Career Criminal Act.166 Holding that a defendant may
not attack a prior conviction in a sentencing proceeding except
under narrow circumstances, the Court cited the presumption of
finality that criminal judgments enjoy.167 Recognizing its prior
ruling in Burgett, the Court held that defendants can attack prior
convictions only when the basis of the attack is that the conviction
was obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel.168 The
Court further held that the absence of counsel, standing alone, does
not trigger any right to collaterally attack a conviction. Rather,
there must have existed a right to counsel that was violated.169
In Nichols v. United States,170 the Court affirmed a sentence that
was enhanced based on the defendant’s prior uncounseled

164 Id. at 115. The Court reached a similar conclusion five years later in United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). Three prior state-court convictions were introduced against the
defendant in his federal trial and were used by the judge at the sentencing hearing. See id.
at 444. After another state court held that two of those prior convictions were constitutionally
invalid because of a deprivation of the defendant’s right to counsel, the defendant asked for a
new trial in federal court, arguing that his federal conviction had been obtained through the
use of these unconstitutional prior convictions. Id. at 445. Although the Ninth Circuit
affirmed his conviction, finding the use of the convictions at trial to be harmless error, it
ordered a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 446. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the grant of
a new sentencing hearing, reasoning that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was
“founded at least in part upon misinformation of constitutional magnitude.” Id. at 447.
165 511 U.S. 485 (1994).
166 Id. at 496 (explaining that the right to attack collaterally prior convictions will not be
extended because failure to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant is a unique
constitutional defect).
167 See id. at 497 (“The interest in promoting the finality of judgments provides additional
support for our constitutional conclusion.”).
168 See id. at 493–96. The Court reaffirmed and extended this rule in Daniels v. United
States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001) (confirming that defendants generally cannot collaterally attack
enhanced sentences based on the validity of a prior conviction because that process would
offend the integrity of the state’s judgments and the criminal process affords other sufficient
avenues to appeal), and Lackawanna County District Attorney. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001)
(declaring that a prisoner who was no longer serving his sentence cannot bring a federal
habeas action directed solely at those convictions).
169 See Custis, 511 U.S. at 497 (requiring a right to counsel be present before a defendant
has a right to collaterally attack his previous conviction).
170 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
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misdemeanor conviction.171 In his prior misdemeanor case for
driving under the influence, the defendant was not provided counsel
and was convicted and fined $250.172 The Court rejected the
defendant’s argument that using a conviction obtained without
counsel (or a valid waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel)
violated the Sixth Amendment.173 Instead, the Court declared that
use of a conviction to enhance a later sentence was constitutionally
permissible if the defendant had no right to counsel in the previous
case.174
The Court has reached similar results concerning tribal-court
convictions.175 Because the Sixth Amendment does not apply to
criminal proceedings in tribal court,176 tribal-court convictions
necessarily cannot violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In
United States v. Bryant, the Court allowed the defendant’s sentence
to be enhanced by a prior uncounseled tribal-court conviction—one
that would have violated the Sixth Amendment if it had been in a
state or federal court.177 This decision comports with the more
general rule that prior uncounseled convictions may be used to
enhance subsequent sentences or charges if the defendant did not
have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the previous
proceeding.178
171 Id. at 749 (“[A]n uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no
prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent
conviction.”).
172 Id. at 740.
173 Id. at 749.
174 Id.
175 See United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[B]ecause the Bill
of Rights does not apply to Indian tribes, tribal convictions cannot violate the Sixth
Amendment.”).
176 See United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1958 (2016) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment does
not apply to tribal court proceedings.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 1963 (containing
very strong language about the importance of recidivism statutes). The defendant in Bryant
had “a record of over 100 tribal-court convictions, including several misdemeanor convictions
for domestic assault.” See id.
177 Id. at 1954 (stating that an uncounseled tribal-court conviction is valid when used to
enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction).
178 See, e.g., Lackawanna Cty. Dist. Att’y v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403–04 (2001) (explaining
that defendants “generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence . . . on the ground that
the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained” unless the challenge is based on a right
to counsel violation); see also Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748–49 (explaining that if the defendant
had no right to counsel in the previous case, use of that conviction to enhance a later sentence
was constitutionally permissible); Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1959 (allowing the defendant’s
sentence to be enhanced by a prior uncounseled tribal court conviction because the Sixth
Amendment does not apply in tribal courts); United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594
(8th Cir. 2011) (allowing uncounseled tribal-court misdemeanor convictions, which otherwise
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Following these rulings, lower federal courts restricted the rule
even further by holding that collateral attacks on prior convictions
were possible only in cases where the defendant not only had a right
to counsel, but also specifically alleged a deprivation of that right.179
Allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel or other
constitutional error typically were not susceptible to collateral
attacks at future sentencing hearings or for purposes of charge
enhancements under statutes like the Armed Career Criminal
Act.180
These restrictions on collateral attacks added to the ongoing
debate about whether courts should use juvenile adjudications to
enhance sentences or charges.181 To the extent that the issue turns
on just how meaningful the due process reforms in the juvenile
system have been, observers come to very different conclusions
about the procedural fairness and reliability of juvenile courts.182

would have violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in U.S. courts, to classify a defendant
as a habitual offender because the convictions were valid at their inception and not alleged
to be otherwise unreliable).
179 Although Custis dealt with the issue of whether the defendant was eligible to be
sentenced pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, many courts have applied the same
logic to cases involving the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Bacon, 94
F.3d 158, 162 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bonds, 48 F.3d 184, 186 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding
the previous state conviction was appropriately applied to augment the defendant’s sentence);
United States v. Thomas, 42 F.3d 823, 824 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Guideline § 4A1.2 stands in the
same posture as the Armed Career Criminal Act . . . .”).
180 See, e.g., United States v. Escobales, 218 F.3d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 2000) (providing that
there is no right to collaterally attack a prior sentence because of an alleged denial of right to
jury trial); United States v. Daly, 28 F.3d 88, 89 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A sole exception to the
prohibition against collateral attack of previous state convictions is for the indigent defendant
who was not appointed counsel at his state trial . . . . Claims of denial of effective assistance
of counsel, where counsel was appointed, and involuntarily pleading guilty do not fall within
this exception.”).
181 See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 902–15 (1988) [hereinafter Feld,
Juvenile Court] (discussing several of the procedural justice consequences of basing juvenile
sentences on the seriousness of prior offenses); Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy:
A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1057–67 (1995)
[hereinafter Feld, Violent Youth] (discussing the use of juvenile convictions to enhance
sentences for adult criminal convictions); Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., The Right to a Public Jury
Trial: A Need for Today’s Juvenile Court, 76 JUDICATURE 230, 239 (1993) (arguing that since
many juvenile defendants are sentenced more harshly as adult offenders based on
considerations of their juvenile records, the Sixth Amendment should be extended to provide
juveniles with a right to a public jury trial).
182 Compare United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
use of a prior juvenile adjudication to enhance sentence was unconstitutional because of the
“significant constitutional differences between adult convictions and juvenile adjudications”),
with United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[J]uvenile adjudications,
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Barry Feld, for example, argued that it was “inconsistent to use less
stringent procedures to obtain convictions in juvenile court in the
name of rehabilitation, and then to use those same convictions to
enhance subsequent criminal sentences as adults.”183 Those
advocating for the use of prior juvenile adjudications to enhance
subsequent criminal sentences, in contrast, argued that as the
juvenile justice system gradually attained more due process
protections, its results could be seen as more reliable and
accurate.184
Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which generally bars
impeachment with a juvenile adjudication,185 arguably supports
preclusion of juvenile convictions to enhance adult sentences. The
Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence explained its decision for
including the general prohibition by reference to the lack of
procedural safeguards to ensure reliable and accurate factfinding in
the juvenile context.186 The advisory committee’s note to Rule 609(d)
explains:
By virtue of its informality, frequently diminished
quantum of required proof, and other departures from
accepted standards for criminal trials . . . , the juvenile
adjudication was considered to lack the precision and
general probative value of the criminal conviction.187
The same concerns regarding the use of juvenile convictions to
enhance later sentences apply to misdemeanors. Today’s
misdemeanor courts struggle with similar complaints of lack of
like adult convictions, are so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such an
exemption.”).
183 Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 181, at 1064.
184 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY: PRIVACY AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE RECORDS 24 (1982) (“By extending many of the adult criminal due process
protections to juvenile trials, the Court has imbued the juvenile trial with elements of
fairness, impartiality, and dispositiveness customarily associated with adult trials. Thus,
when a juvenile is found delinquent today there is reason for confidence in the fairness and
accuracy of that judgment.”).
185 See FED. R. EVID. 609(d) (providing that evidence of a juvenile adjudication is only
admissible if offered in a criminal case, the adjudication was of a witness other than the
defendant, an adult’s conviction for that offense would be admissible, and admitting the
evidence is necessary to fairly determine guilt or innocence).
186 FED. R. EVID. 609(d) advisory committee’s note to subdivision (d) (“The prevailing view
has been that a juvenile adjudication is not usable for impeachment . . . . This conclusion was
based upon a variety of circumstances.”).
187 Id.
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reliability, precision, and procedural safeguards.188 Like juvenile
courts, many misdemeanor adjudications lack the right to a jury
trial, the formal right to counsel, or meaningful access to the
effective assistance of counsel, and are characterized by an air of
informality that tends to undermine confidence in the result.189
Because of the overlapping critiques of juvenile and misdemeanor
courtrooms, misdemeanor convictions similarly should be viewed
with skepticism—especially when used to enhance a later
sentence—and opportunities to present collateral attacks should be
less restricted.
State courts have grappled with the tension between finality and
due process in using allegedly unreliable prior convictions to
enhance sentences or upgrade charges. In State v. Von Ferguson,190
for example, the Supreme Court of Utah addressed the use of a prior
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance a charge to a
felony.191 The government attempted to use Von Ferguson’s prior
conviction for violation of a protective order to charge him as a
recidivist after his subsequent felony violation of a protective
order.192 Von Ferguson objected, arguing that his prior conviction
had been obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.193 On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah
agreed with Von Ferguson that even a misdemeanor resulting in an
entirely suspended sentence was unconstitutional and invalid
unless accompanied either by the presence of counsel or a valid
waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel.194 Because there was no
188 See generally Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 8 (discussing how lower courts readily
contribute to mass misdemeanors).
189 See id. at 620 (describing the rapid and informal “assembly-line justice” approach in
misdemeanor courts).
190 169 P.3d 423 (Utah 2007).
191 See id. at 432 (deciding that “a previous uncounseled conviction imposing a suspended
sentence cannot be used to enhance a subsequent criminal charge unless the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel”).
192 See id. at 425.
193 See id. (noting the defendant’s objection that his prior conviction violated his
constitutional rights because he was not represented by counsel).
194 See id. at 428–29 (“An uncounseled misdemeanor conviction imposing a sentence of
incarceration, either actual or suspended, is not valid. Therefore, a conviction obtained in
violation of Scott or Shelton cannot be used for enhancement purposes.”). It is clear that a
misdemeanor conviction imposing a suspended sentence is invalid absent appointment or a
valid waiver of counsel. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002) (“‘[A] defendant
who receives a suspended or probated sentence to imprisonment has a constitutional right to
counsel.’” (quoting Ex parte Shelton, 851 So. 2d 96, 102 (Ala. 2000))). But lower state and
federal courts appear to be split as to whether a misdemeanor conviction and sentence of
“probation” with no suspended term of incarceration is similarly unconstitutional. See State
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dispute that Von Ferguson had not been represented by counsel in
connection with the prior misdemeanor conviction, that conviction
could not be used to enhance his subsequent criminal charge.195
The Von Ferguson court held that even uncounseled convictions
are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of regularity, reasoning
that “courts are assumed to have complied with well-established
requirements ensuring that any waiver of the right to counsel is
made knowingly and intelligently.”196 The Supreme Court of
Montana came to a similar conclusion in State v. Maine,197 a case
that involved an allegation not of an actual deprivation of the right
to counsel, but of the ineffective assistance of counsel. 198 The court
recognized the rebuttable presumption of regularity but rejected the
state’s argument that a defendant could only collaterally attack
prior convictions on the basis that they were obtained in violation
of the defendant’s rights under Gideon v. Wainwright199 and its
direct progeny.200 The court held that such a restriction would be
under-protective of defendants’ rights.201
These cases demonstrate that courts tend to be in broad
agreement that prior convictions are entitled to a presumption of
regularity. There is less consensus, however, on the logistics of
whether and how a defendant can rebut that presumption. Federal
and state courts differ widely on issues of which party has the
burden of proof when a prior conviction is called into question, and
by what standard of proof that party must convince the court.
B. COLLATERAL ATTACKS ON PRIOR CONVICTIONS: BURDENS OF
PRODUCTION AND PERSUASION

Courts differ greatly in assigning burdens of production and
persuasion in the context of challenging prior convictions at
sentencing. Some clearly require the defendant to produce evidence
v. Wilson, 771 N.W.2d 228, 233–35 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009) (collecting federal and state cases
and describing split of authority in “stand alone probation” misdemeanors).
195 Von Ferguson, 169 P.3d at 425.
196 Id. at 431 (citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31 (1992)).
197 255 P.3d 64 (Mont. 2011).
198 Maine was charged with fourth offense DUI, a felony in Montana, because of the three
prior DUI convictions. Id. at 66. Maine claimed that his attorney at one of his previous DUI
trials was ineffective for failing to raise the “compulsion” defense, as Maine claimed that he
had been fleeing an assault when he was apprehended for DUI. Id. at 67.
199 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
200 Maine, 255 P.3d at 69, 73.
201 Id. at 69.
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to satisfy the burden of production, after which the ultimate burden
of persuasion shifts to the prosecution.202 Others have held that the
defendant, as the moving party, retains the burden of persuasion.203
Courts that have situated the ultimate burden of persuasion on the
prosecution have imposed various standards of proof as well.204
When a defendant challenges a prior conviction, courts must turn
to some procedural framework to conduct a meaningful review of
the claim.
In a recent case from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, the defendant moved to dismiss his indictment
for illegal reentry,205 arguing that he was deprived of due process in
the two deportation proceedings that formed the predicate for
conviction of the instant offense.206 He argued that, because neither
of the prior deportation proceedings provided him with due process,
neither could form the prerequisite for a prosecution of illegal
reentry.207 To the extent another federal statute, the
“jurisdiction-stripping statute,”208 foreclosed such collateral attacks
in subsequent prosecutions, the defendant argued that the statute
was unconstitutional.209
Although the district court denied the defendant’s motion to
dismiss the indictment, the court agreed that the
jurisdiction-stripping statute was unconstitutional “to the extent it
prohibits ‘some meaningful review’ . . . of an alien’s claim that the
underlying deportation proceeding,” which constitutes an element
of the criminal charge, “was ‘fundamentally unfair.’”210 Because the
202 See Raley, 506 U.S. at 33 (“Several [states] . . . take a middle position that requires the
defendant to produce evidence of invalidity once the fact of conviction is proved but that shifts
the burden back to the prosecution once the defendant satisfies his burden of production.”
(first citing Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834, 837 (Colo. 1982) (guilty plea); then citing State
v. O’Neil, 580 P.2d 495, 497 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (uncounseled conviction); and then citing
State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989) (uncounseled conviction))).
203 See id. (“Others assign the entire burden to the defendant once the government has
established the fact of conviction.” (citing People v. Harris, 459 N.E.2d 170, 172 (N.Y. 1983)
(guilty plea))).
204 See, e.g., Triptow, 770 P.2d at 149 (requiring a preponderance of the evidence); Watkins,
655 P.2d at 837 (requiring a preponderance of the evidence); State v. Hennings, 670 P.2d 256,
257 (Wash. 1983) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
205 United States v. Silva, 313 F. Supp. 3d 660 (E.D. Va. 2018).
206 Id. at 668–69 (discussing the defendant’s collateral attack).
207 Id.
208 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(D) (2018).
209 See Silva, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 668 (arguing that the statute is either unconstitutional
when applied to Criminal Illegal Reentry cases or Congress intended that such cases could
not be premised on expedited removals).
210 Id. at 669 (citing United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 838–39 (1987)).
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statute prohibited judicial review of the underlying administrative
finding—in that case, the Order of Removal—, the court found that
it was unconstitutional.211 Similarly, a stringent application of the
presumption of regularity that precludes examination of the
proceedings leading to a prior conviction could well violate
principles of due process.
In reviewing administrative findings that formed a predicate for
a criminal conviction, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “where a
determination made in an administrative proceeding is to play a
critical role in the subsequent imposition of a criminal sanction,
there must be some meaningful review of the administrative
proceeding.”212 Such administrative proceedings lack the procedural
safeguards of the criminal process. When the findings are used
against a criminal defendant, therefore, courts must supply some of
the procedural safeguards that were not necessarily present at the
administrative proceeding below.213 If one understands
misdemeanor prosecutions as akin to administrative proceedings,
then the same logic counsels caution against uncritically accepting
the findings of those proceedings.
In United States v. Martinez-Cruz,214 the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit dealt with the issue of burdens of production and
persuasion in the context of a collateral attack on a prior conviction.
The defendant, Alfonso Martinez-Cruz, pleaded guilty to one count
of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and argued that he

Id.
Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 837–38. Mendoza-Lopez involved two defendants who had
been charged with Illegal Reentry after having been previously subjected to a mass
deportation proceeding. Id. at 830–31. Both defendants challenged the constitutional validity
of the underlying orders of removal, arguing that they had not been informed of their right to
counsel at the group deportation proceeding and that their waivers of various rights at the
mass deportation proceeding had been unknowing and therefore violative of their due process
rights. Id. at 831. The trial court agreed with them and dismissed the indictments and the
circuit court affirmed that decision. Id. at 831–32. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, holding
that even if Congress intended to preclude collateral challenges to previous deportation
orders in this context, such a rule violated the due process rights of the defendants. Id. at
837.
213 Id. at 841. The Mendoza-Lopez Court did not rule on what level of process was required
in the underlying administrative proceeding, only that the results of such proceedings may
only be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution if some review is available to the
defendants. Id. at 839 (“Depriving an alien of the right to have the disposition in a deportation
hearing reviewed in a judicial forum requires, at a minimum, that review be made available
in any subsequent proceeding in which the result of the deportation proceeding is used to
establish an element of a criminal offense.”).
214 736 F.3d 999 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
211
212
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should be sentenced pursuant to the federal “safety valve.”215 The
offense of conviction carried a mandatory minimum term of
incarceration of five years, subject only to the safety valve
exception.216 Martinez-Cruz qualified for the safety valve in every
respect but one: his prior state-court DUI conviction from Georgia
rendered him ineligible.217 Martinez-Cruz would have faced a
presumptive Guidelines range of between forty-six and fifty-seven
months if the prior DUI conviction were not used in calculating his
criminal history score.218 But the prior conviction, which
disqualified him from the safety valve, caused his Guidelines range
to more than double.219 Accordingly, the lower court sentenced him
to eighty-one months in prison, the low end of what the court
determined to be the applicable Guidelines range.220
Martinez-Cruz argued at sentencing that his prior DUI
conviction was unconstitutional and invalid because he had never
been informed of his right to counsel and so had not voluntarily and
knowingly waived that right.221 In support of this claim, he
submitted two affidavits to the court stating that he was illiterate
in both English and Spanish, that nobody had explained to him his
right to counsel or the waiver-of-rights form that he signed, and that
215 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2018) (allowing sentences below statutory minimums for
defendants who have little to no criminal history and truthfully disclose information to the
government about the crime before sentencing).
216 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii) (2018) (imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of
five years for violations involving five grams or more of methamphetamine); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(f) (2018) (limiting applicability of statutory minimums in certain cases).
Martinez-Cruz was assessed one criminal history point for his prior Georgia conviction and
two additional points because the offense for which he was facing sentencing happened while
he was on probation for the Georgia DUI conviction. Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d at 1000.
217 Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d at 1000 (explaining that the defendant’s criminal history score
was three points due to a DUI conviction, which rendered him ineligible for a reduction).
218 See id. (explaining that the reduction would have resulted in a two-level decrease of the
defendant’s base offense level and a two-and-a-half-year decrease of the bottom of the
Guidelines range).
219 See
id. (explaining that “because of a prior driving-under-the-influence
conviction[,] . . . his criminal history score was in fact three points” rather than just one). The
court imposed an eighty-one-month sentence, the bottom of the Guidelines range, because the
DUI conviction raised Martinez-Cruz’s criminal history to three points. However, had the
DUI conviction not been counted, Martinez-Cruz’s base offense level would have decreased
by two levels, which would have resulted in a two-and-a-half-year sentence decrease from the
bottom end of the recommended range—a fifty-one-month sentence instead of an
eighty-one-month sentence.
220 See id.
221 See id. (“Martinez-Cruz maintain[ed] that at the time of his plea to the DUI charge he
was not properly informed of his right to counsel, and thus did not validly waive that right,
so that the DUI conviction was in violation of the Constitution.”).
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he had no memory of appearing before a judge.222 Additional
evidence showed that the prior conviction had been entered only two
days after the Martinez-Cruz’s arrest in Georgia.223 He “spoke no
English, and could neither read nor write Spanish.”224 After having
been arrested and detained for two days, he was brought to court
from jail and was offered a time-served plea, which he accepted.225
He also “received a waiver-of-counsel form in Spanish” and “printed
his name on [it].”226 There was no transcript from the plea
proceeding.227
Without taking testimony, but after having considered the
affidavits submitted by Martinez-Cruz, the sentencing court found
that the defendant had “failed to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that this was not a conviction that he knowingly
accepted.” Martinez-Cruz had failed, therefore, to satisfy the burden
of proof.228 The sentencing court rejected his argument that the
evidence of his inability to read coupled with the lack of evidence
showing that his rights were explained to him satisfied his burden
of production by creating a “fair inference” that he never knowingly
and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.229
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, but it took
pains to limit the reach of its holding.230 Much of the D.C. Circuit’s
holding in Martinez-Cruz builds upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Parke v. Raley.231 In Parke, the defendant was sentenced
as a “persistent felony offender” under a recidivist sentencing
222 See id. at 1001 (“In a pair of affidavits attached to his two sentencing memoranda,
Martinez-Cruz asserted not only that he was illiterate, but also that nobody explained to him
the waiver-of-counsel form, that he did not recall appearing before a judge, and that he was
absolutely certain that if he did appear before a judge, the judge did not conduct an
individualized plea colloquy of the sort that took place at the time of his methamphetamine
plea. Absent an explanation of his right to counsel that he could understand, Martinez-Cruz
argues, a waiver of that right could not be knowing and intelligent . . . .” (internal citations
omitted)).
223 See id. (stating that the defendant pleaded guilty after spending two days in jail).
224 Id.
225 See id. (“He spent two days in jail before pleading guilty; in exchange for his plea, his
sentence was limited to time served and one year’s probation.”)
226 Id.
227 See id. (“The court did not keep a transcript of the plea . . . .”).
228 Id.
229 Id. (discussing the defendant’s argument that the inference must shift the burden of
persuasion to the government).
230 See id. at 1002 (“Today we consider how heavy a burden may be assigned the
defendant—but only in cases where the defendant alleges that a prior conviction or plea was
secured in violation of the right to counsel.”).
231 506 U.S. 20 (1992).
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statute.232 To overcome the presumption of regularity attached to
prior convictions, Kentucky required defendants to “produce
evidence that his or her rights were infringed or that some
procedural irregularity occurred.”233 Only after satisfying such a
burden of production did the Kentucky law impose a burden of
persuasion on the government.234
The defendant challenged this scheme, arguing that imposing
any burden at all on the defendant violated due process. But the
U.S. Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument, instead
holding that a presumption of regularity did not violate the
defendant’s constitutional rights: “Even when a collateral attack on
a final conviction rests on constitutional grounds, the presumption
of regularity that attaches to final judgments makes it appropriate
to assign a proof burden to the defendant.”235
Parke did not, however, specify precisely what type of burden was
permissible or what standard of proof would govern. As the
Martinez-Cruz court read the Parke decision, it “d[id] no more than
uphold the constitutionality of requiring a defendant to meet a
burden of production.”236 The majority in Martinez-Cruz said that
the issue presented “a tension between two basic presumptions of
our legal tradition”: (1) the presumption of regularity that attaches
to final judgments, and (2) the “unique constitutional defect” that is
the failure to provide counsel.237 The presumption of regularity
exists because “[i]nroads on the concept of finality tend to
undermine confidence in the integrity of our procedures and
inevitably delay and impair the orderly administration of justice.”238
Moreover, resources dedicated to the re-examination of old cases are
unavailable for reaching judgments in new cases.239
232 Id. at 23 (describing defendant’s status as a persistent felony offender based on two
burglary convictions).
233 Id. at 24.
234 See id. (“If the defendant refutes the presumption of regularity, the burden shifts back
to the government affirmatively to show that the underlying judgment was entered in a
manner that did, in fact, protect the defendant’s rights.”).
235 Id. at 31.
236 United States v. Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d 999, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
237 Id. at 1002–03.
238 Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 497 (1994) (discussing this as mentioned in
Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d at 1003).
239 See Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d at 1003 (“[I]t seems plain that resources devoted to
reexamination of judgments in old cases are unavailable for reaching accurate judgments in
new ones.”). But see id. at 1006–08 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (focusing on the long tradition
in American courts of punishing recidivists more harshly than first-time offenders). On the
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The court explained at some length why alleged violations of the
right to counsel are different in nature and more serious than
allegations of other types of procedural errors, and why its analysis
did not necessarily extend to other types of collateral attacks on
prior convictions.240 Moreover, reviewing courts can analyze the
merits of an alleged violation of a defendant’s right to counsel in a
prior proceeding with relative ease.241 In contrast to other types of
alleged constitutional infirmities, in cases where the defendant
alleges a previous violation of his or her right to counsel, “the only
issue will be whether [the defendant] validly waived counsel. If that
involves ‘rummaging,’ it is only with respect to a relatively narrow
issue.”242
In describing what kind of showing a defendant must make
before the ultimate burden shifts to the government, the
Martinez-Cruz court said:
[T]he defendant [must] produce[] objective evidence
sufficient to support a reasonable inference that his
right to counsel was not validly waived. That evidence
must entail more than a silent record, or even the
defendant’s sworn statement that he was not informed
of his rights. To carry this burden, the defendant’s
evidence generally must supply a reason to believe that
the court had no ordinary procedure capable of
apprising him adequately of his rights or that the court
did not follow its own procedures.243

concept of finality, see Brandon Hasbrouck, Saving Justice: Why Sentencing Errors Fall
Within the Savings Clause, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255(e), 108 GEO L.J. 287, 293 n.37 (2019).
240 See Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d at 1003 (“Anti-recidivist provisions . . . can extend the
effects of an invalid conviction, making it the basis for progressively more severe penalties.
The right to counsel is a shield against that result. By radically reducing the risk that a
defendant might be convicted in violation of other rights, it helps to forestall such a spiral of
error.”).
241 See Custis, 511 U.S. at 496 (“[F]ailure to appoint counsel at all will generally appear
from the judgment roll itself, or from an accompanying minute order. But determination of
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and failure to assure that a guilty plea was
voluntary, would require sentencing courts to rummage through frequently nonexistent or
difficult to obtain state-court transcripts or records that may date from another era, and may
come from any one of the 50 states.”).
242 See Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d at 1004.
243 Id.
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The Martinez-Cruz court posited that it generally would not be
difficult for the prosecution to satisfy the ultimate burden of
persuasion in such cases, rejecting the government’s contrary
argument:
Here, for example, the government might have
introduced information on the typical plea practices in
Gwinnett County[, Georgia]. . . . The government might
also have secured an affidavit from the judge before who
Martinez-Cruz entered his plea, stating in some detail
what practices were routine at the time the plea was
made.244
Although the Martinez-Cruz court does not address this issue, a
requirement that a court evaluate the validity of a challenged prior
conviction before using it would serve a beneficial educational and
reform function, especially for low-level courts. The prospect of
having to describe the actual workings of the court might lead
judges and other actors to be more careful about the administration
of justice, especially in courts that, for all practical purposes, are
never reviewed by any superior court. Direct appeals from
misdemeanor courts are very rare, and requiring prosecutors to
learn about and reveal what happens in those courts could have a
positive effect on how those courts administer justice.
State courts, too, have come to different conclusions about which
party bears the ultimate burden of persuasion as well as what a
defendant must produce to initially rebut the presumption of
regularity. The Supreme Court of Utah, in the Von Ferguson case,245
recognized that even an uncounseled conviction was entitled to a
presumption of regularity.246 The court went on, however, to address
the weight of that presumption and the manner in which a
defendant might rebut it.247 The court concluded that the
presumption required only minimal evidence to be overcome by the

Id.
State v. Von Ferguson, 169 P.3d 423 (Utah 2007); see also supra notes 190–196 and
accompanying text.
246 See Von Ferguson, 169 P.3d at 430 (“Even those judgments based on uncounseled
convictions are entitled to a presumption of regularity.”).
247 See id. at 426 (“Ferguson may rebut this presumption, however, by offering minimal
evidence that the conviction was obtained in violation of his right to counsel. If he does so,
the burden of establishing the validity of the conviction shifts back to the State.”).
244
245
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defendant because to require more could undermine defendants’
constitutional rights, shift the ultimate burden to defendants, and
erode the “special status” of claims alleging deprivation of the right
to counsel.248 The Von Ferguson court made clear that a defendant’s
own testimony, without more, was sufficient to rebut the
presumption of regularity in such contexts, after which the
government bore the burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue of
whether the underlying conviction was validly obtained.249
The Supreme Court of Montana addressed the question of how
rebuttable the presumption is in State v. Maine.250 The court first
recited its procedural framework for evaluating claims that a prior
conviction was invalid, recognizing that the prior conviction carries
with it a presumption of regularity that can be rebutted by “direct
evidence” of its invalidity by the defendant, after which the state
must produce direct evidence and “prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the prior conviction was not entered in violation of the
defendant’s rights.”251 The court then held that a defendant could
attack a prior conviction for any type of constitutional invalidity but
that, as the moving party, the defendant should bear the ultimate
burden of persuasion that the prior conviction was invalid.252 The
court explained that the defendant must present “affirmative
evidence” that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained
and that “[s]elf-serving statements by the defendant that his or her
conviction is infirm are insufficient to overcome the presumption of
regularity.”253 Although the court assigned some burden to the
248 See id. at 432 (explaining the court’s trouble with requiring more than defendant’s own
testimony).
249 See id. (“In summary, although [Von] Ferguson must do more than merely produce a
copy of the conviction reflecting that he was not represented by counsel, he need only come
forward with some evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity. His own testimony that
he did not waive his right to counsel is sufficient for this purpose. If [Von] Ferguson produces
such evidence, the burden then shifts to the State to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that [Von] Ferguson knowingly waived his right to counsel.” (citing State v. Baker,
485 N.W.2d 237, 248 (Wis. 1992))); see also State v. Kvislen, 64 P.3d 1006, 1010–11 (Mont.
2003) (explaining that defendant’s submission of an affidavit stating that he had not been
advised of his trial date or of his right to counsel was sufficient to rebut the presumption of
regularity and the trial court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing on whether the
state could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his prior conviction was
constitutionally valid).
250 255 P.3d 64 (Mont. 2011).
251 Id. at 68.
252 See id. at 73–74 (providing that, under Montana state law, “the defendant has the initial
burden to demonstrate that the prior conviction is constitutionally infirm; and . . . once the
defendant has done so, the State has the burden to rebut the defendant’s evidence”).
253 Id. at 74.

2020]

THE MEANING OF A MISDEMEANOR

971

prosecution, it imposed the ultimate burden of persuasion on the
defendant, a result different from that in the Von Ferguson case.254
C. TWO PROPOSALS

Courts would benefit from a clear and consistent articulation and
application of burdens of proof in the context of prior conviction
evidence. Although unchallenged prior convictions will continue to
enjoy a presumption of validity,255 a defendant should be free to
contest the validity of any prior conviction that may have been
obtained unconstitutionally. Of course, in the absence of any such
challenge by the defendant, a sentencing court is free to consider all
prior convictions valid for purposes of sentencing.256 As the moving
party, the defendant should bear the burden of production in
challenging a prior conviction. This burden should not be satisfied
by bare or general assertions, but rather by direct evidence that,
when viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, would allow
a court to conclude that the prior conviction was obtained in
violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. After the
defendant makes this prima facie showing, however, the
prosecution should bear the ultimate burden of persuasion that the
prior conviction was validly obtained through constitutionally
appropriate proceedings. If the prosecution is unable to convince the
sentencing court that the prior conviction was constitutional, then
the sentencing court should disregard the prior conviction for
purposes of sentencing.
Ultimately, however, the factfinding abilities of low-level courts
have been so called into question,257 and the influence of improper
factors like racism and poverty so amply demonstrated to have
perverting effects on outcomes,258 that courts and legislatures
should consider a categorical rule against including prior
misdemeanor convictions in calculations of criminal histories. Just

See supra notes 197–201 and accompanying text.
See supra Section III.A.
256 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 144 (1998) (holding that prior
convictions are “sentencing factors” which may be determined by a judge); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2) (2018) (listing the “history and characteristics of the defendant” as one of the
factors to be considered in a sentencing hearing).
257 See supra notes 5–6, 10.
258 See discussion supra Sections III.A, III.C.
254
255
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as convictions from other countries are considered skeptically,259 so
too should courts have grave reservations about uncritically
adopting prior conviction evidence from low-level courts in
fashioning appropriate sentences for those defendants before them.
Conscientious judges in both state and federal courts continue to
struggle with both the general principle and the specific procedures
to consider when a defendant challenges the constitutionality and
validity of prior convictions. Although a clearer procedural
framework that places the burden of persuasion squarely with the
prosecution will assist those judges in resolving specific challenges,
a larger issue remains. As evidence mounts that low-level courts
have an adversarialism problem and a resulting accuracy problem,
courts and legislatures should consider broadly excluding
misdemeanor convictions from calculations of criminal history.
Such an approach would be more easily applied in a consistent
manner and would serve to combat the influences of race and
poverty that we know infect decisionmaking in the criminal justice
system.
V. CONCLUSION
Only a quarter century ago, in denying habeas relief to a prisoner
who had claimed actual innocence, Justice O’Connor expressed
incredulity at the idea of a factually innocent person being convicted
of a crime: “Our society has a high degree of confidence in its
criminal trials, in no small part because the Constitution offers
unparalleled protections against convicting the innocent.”260 Little
did she know that she wrote at the beginning of what would become
known as the innocence movement, as the advent of DNA evidence
showed the very real phenomenon of wrongful convictions.261 Times
have changed since Justice O’Connor wrote those words, and society
has rightly become more skeptical about the ability of the criminal
justice system to achieve accurate results. It is time now to
incorporate this newfound and hard-won skepticism into our

259 See Alex Glashausser, The Treatment of Foreign Country Convictions as Predicates for
Sentence Enhancements Under Recidivist Statutes, 44 DUKE L.J. 134, 137–52 (1994) (finding
that treatment of foreign convictions has been uneven in U.S. courts due to concerns about
the reliability of criminal justice systems in foreign countries).
260 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 420 (1993).
261 See supra note 9.
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jurisprudence, especially when dealing with low-level courts and
their spotty record of accuracy in determining guilt.
After Ferguson and the innocence movement, we have ample
reason to believe that low-level convictions are not reliable, and that
other values, such as efficiency and profitability, predominate over
accuracy and reliability in the adjudication of misdemeanors.262 As
we have become less convinced of the reliability of low-level
convictions, however, we have magnified their effects on the
adjudication of subsequent cases. We now know of the levels of
inaccuracy in low-level lower courts. The doctrine must evolve to
incorporate this new knowledge in the same way that the DNA
revelations have led us to understand wrongful convictions and
false confessions.
The problems with accuracy and reliability in misdemeanor
adjudication cannot be overlooked simply because they are minor
crimes without serious consequences. Our system of criminal justice
has “a proportionality problem. Minor misdemeanors can trigger
massive collateral consequences, often without adequate notice or
meaningful process. Outcomes systematically appear arbitrary,
disproportionate, and procedurally unfair.”263 Even well-meaning
police and prosecutors in misdemeanor courts are unable to control
the collateral consequences of the charges they pursue. One scholar
accuses police and prosecutors in low-level courts of having
“abdicated responsibility for regulating key aspects of the harm that
stems from misdemeanors.”264 It is difficult, however, for any of
those actors to control the countless consequences that are applied
externally by public and private actors. In the case of sentencing
enhancements and recidivism statutes, however, courts and
prosecutors have a heightened responsibility—as well as the direct
ability—to mitigate and regulate this harm.
Misdemeanor convictions have an outsize influence on
subsequent convictions and sentences given the rise of
guidelines-based sentencing systems and the rapid growth in
volume of misdemeanor courts.265 Increasingly, state governments
are looking for ways to adjudicate low-level crimes without
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Jain, supra note 100, at 954.
264 Id. at 955.
265 See Roberts, supra note 24, at 785 (stating that the number of misdemeanor
prosecutions has doubled in the past forty-five years and now one in three individuals has an
arrest or conviction record).
262
263
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counsel.266 Without counsel, other procedural safeguards fall away
as well. There is frequently no real incentive to challenge an
underlying conviction, especially in a misdemeanor case.267 Often,
defendant and state are complicit in resolving cases in a way that
has nothing to do with accuracy. If misdemeanor courts are not
primarily concerned with accuracy as a value, we should hesitate
before using those results automatically to enhance subsequent
charges and sentences.
Ultimately, any reform to the practice of using prior conviction
evidence represents a shift in the meaning of a criminal history.
Even low-level convictions can be considered symbolic “markers” of
who is within and outside of the community of upstanding citizens.
But as evidence mounts about how little such convictions have to do
with moral culpability or even accurate factfinding, they become
less meaningful as any kind of marker at all. As described above,
Congress determined that criminal convictions from foreign courts
and tribal courts—as well as juvenile delinquency adjudications—
would not be factored into criminal history scores under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines.268 The lack of guarantees ensuring
reliability of such convictions would make their use in enhancing
sentences under the Guidelines unfair.269
Because of changes in the charging and processing of low-level
crimes, the cultural meaning of a misdemeanor conviction has
changed. Increasingly, there is an understanding that “the nature
and expanding reach of the criminal justice system undermine the

266 See SPANGENBERG PROJECT, CTR. FOR JUSTICE, LAW & SOC’Y AT GEORGE MASON UNIV.,
AN UPDATE ON STATE EFFORTS IN MISDEMEANOR RECLASSIFICATION, PENALTY REDUCTION
AND
ALTERNATIVE
SENTENCING
1
(2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendant
s/ls_sclaid_def_aba_tsp_reclassification_report.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing how states
have reclassified certain crimes into non-jailable offenses to decrease caseloads for public
defenders and reduce court dockets).
267 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d 999, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that the onus is on the defendant, not the government,
to point out defects with prior convictions, when challenging sentencing guidelines).
268 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(h) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018); see also id. § 4A1.2(i) (providing that “[s]entences resulting from foreign convictions”
and “tribal court convictions are not counted”).
269 See United States v. Azeem, 946 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Were a global approach
required, we would soon find it necessary to determine the appropriate evidence that must
be produced by the prosecution to show that the activity occurred and that it violated foreign
law.”).
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culpability.”270 This change in perspective regarding the
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moral

moral meaning in the criminal law has come about not
only because of a shift in culpability requirements of
conviction, but also because of the characteristics of
those who are most likely to be subject to a criminal
conviction. The prevalence of social disadvantage
among the convicted complicates the notion that
character flaws are responsible for criminal
convictions.271
As the scope of the criminal law has expanded in recent years,
and as more crimes involving strict liability have grown, the
meaning of a criminal conviction has become less clear. As it
becomes easier and easier to transgress the criminal law,272 a
criminal conviction no longer correlates either with factual guilt or
moral blameworthiness. Courts should not be shy about taking
account of these changed circumstances when evaluating criminal
histories from low-level courts.

Roberts, supra note 13, at 587.
Id. at 589.
272 See id. (noting Harvey Silverglate’s theory that every person unwittingly commits three
felonies a day, making criminal behavior a societal norm (citing L. Gordon Crovitz, You
Commit Three Felonies a Day, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2009, 11:09 PM),
http://perma.cc/VGV8-ELQ9)).
270
271
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